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Abstract
This Article explores the division of war-making authority between the President
and Congress through the prism of positive political theory. For the most part,
the scholarly treatment of the war-powers debate has been normative with various
commentators offering various textual or functional accounts of what the proper
allocation of war-making authority should be. This Article provides a positive ac-
count of the war-making powers by focusing on the domestic political constraints
that the political branches face in the context of an imminent military build-up or
troop deployment. This Article assumes that the President has the exclusive abil-
ity to influence the scope of an international crisis that precedes an actual armed
conflict by making public threats against foreign states. Once such public threats
reach a critical threshold, however, backing down by any domestic institutional
actor becomes difficult due to the presence of significant domestic audience costs.
In other words, since a domestic audience is likely to punish any domestic insti-
tutional actor that attempts to back down from an escalating international crisis,
neither Congress nor the courts have much of an incentive to intervene once the
President decides to initiate conflict. The President thus has a significant institu-
tional advantage in framing the domestic audience costs for going to war. Given
this apparent agenda-setting advantage, however, it is puzzling as to why the Pres-
ident would ever seek congressional authorization before initiating international
conflicts. This Article argues that the presidential decision to seek congressional
authorization is determined by a two-level strategic game of domestic and inter-
national interaction. At the domestic level, once the President decides to initiate
conflict, he has an incentive to seek congressional authorization as a form of po-
litical insurance if he believes that the war is going to be fairly long or costly, or if
he is uncertain about the prospects of victory. At the international level, the Pres-
ident also has an incentive to seek congressional authorization if he is uncertain
about the outcome of the conflict and wants to send a costly signal to the foreign
enemy about the country’s resolve to prosecute the conflict. In sum, the ex-ante
beliefs of the President regarding the outcome of a conflict and the possibility of
subsequent punishment by a domestic audience ultimately determine his decision
to seek congressional authorization. Finally, this Article also argues that Congress
has an incentive to constrain the President’s war-making agenda in the shadow of
a politically unpopular war. But while the President often shapes public opinion in
his war powers role, Congress tends to react to public opinion when it constrains
the President’s war initiatives. This Article uses historical case studies, including
the 2003 invasion of Iraq, to test these theoretical arguments.
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This Article explores the division of war-making authority  
between the President and Congress through the prism of positive political theory.  For 
the most part, the scholarly treatment of the war-powers debate has been normative with 
various commentators offering various textual or functional accounts of what the proper 
allocation of war-making authority should be.  This Article provides a positive account of 
the war-making powers by focusing on the domestic political constraints that the political 
branches face in the context of an imminent military build-up or troop deployment.  This 
Article assumes that the President has the exclusive ability to influence the scope of an 
international crisis that precedes an actual armed conflict by making public threats 
against foreign states.  Once such public threats reach a critical threshold, however, 
backing down by any domestic institutional actor becomes difficult due to the presence of 
significant domestic audience costs.  In other words, since a domestic audience is likely to 
punish any domestic institutional actor that attempts to back down from an escalating 
international crisis, neither Congress nor the courts have much of an incentive to 
intervene once the President decides to initiate conflict.  The President thus has a 
significant institutional advantage in framing the domestic audience costs for going to 
war. Given this apparent agenda-setting advantage, however, it is puzzling as to why the 
President would ever seek congressional authorization before initiating international 
conflicts.  This Article argues that the presidential decision to seek congressional 
authorization is determined by a two-level strategic game of domestic and international 
interaction.  At the domestic level, once the President decides to initiate conflict, he has 
an incentive to seek congressional authorization as a form of political insurance if he 
believes that the war is going to be fairly long or costly, or if he is uncertain about the 
prospects of victory.  At the international level, the President also has an incentive to seek 
congressional authorization if he is uncertain about the outcome of the conflict and wants 
to send a costly signal to the foreign enemy about the country’s resolve to prosecute the 
conflict.  In sum, the ex-ante beliefs of the President regarding the outcome of a conflict 
and the possibility of subsequent punishment by a domestic audience ultimately determine 
his decision to seek congressional authorization.  Finally, this Article also argues that 
Congress has an incentive to constrain the President’s war-making agenda in the shadow 
of a politically unpopular war.  But while the President often shapes public opinion in his 
war powers role, Congress tends to react to public opinion when it constrains the 
President’s war initiatives.  This Article uses historical case studies, including the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, to test these theoretical arguments.  
 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School.   B.A. 1993, St. John’s College; 
M.P.A. 1995, Princeton; J.D. 1998, Yale.  I am grateful to John Yoo, Daryl Levinson, Tom Ginsburg, John 
McGinnis, Steven Calabresi, Max Schazenbach, and others for helpful comments and advice.  This Article 
also benefited from comments at workshops at Northwestern University Law School, Northwestern 
University’s Center for International and Comparative Studies, and the International Law Conference at 
University of California Boalt Hall School of Law.  I would also like to thank Gaurav Mathur, Brian 
Axelrad, Avital Even-Shoshan, and Rob Nederhood for their excellent research assistance. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution 2 
CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................2 
I. A THEORY OF WAR-MAKING AUTHORITY............................................................ 7 
A. The Early Executive Advantage: Exclusive Domination over the Crisis Escalation 
Agenda ............................................................................................................... 8 
1.  The Sole Organ of Communications in Foreign Affairs................................... 12 
2.  The High Public Visibility of Use of Force Issues ............................................ 14 
B.  Uncertainty About the Use of Force Outcomes and the Scope of the Two-Level 
Interaction ........................................................................................................ 16 
1. The Domestic Level: Buying Political Insurance in Wars with Uncertain  
Outcomes ..................................................................................................... 17 
2.  The International Level: Sending Costly Signals to Foreign Adversaries ........... 28 
II.  THE CASE STUDIES OF PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL INTERACTION ON WAR-
POWERS ............................................................................................................... 30 
A. The 1982-1984 Intervention in Lebanon and the 1983 Intervention in 
Grenada ................................................................................................................... 32 
1. Lebanon........................................................................................................ 32 
2.     Grenada ....................................................................................................... 41 
B.  The 1992-1993 intervention in Somalia............................................................. 46 
C.    The 2003 Invasion of Iraq ................................................................................. 51 
D.    The Cases That do Not Seem to Conform to the Model ...................................... 56 
III.   IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY FOR NORMATIVE WAR POWERS              
SCHOLARSHIP ...................................................................................................... 60 
A. Why Congress Does Not Have an Incentive to Change the Balance                           
of  War Powers ................................................................................................. 61 
B.  Why the Courts are Unlikely to Tip the Balance of War Powers In             
Congress’s Favor .............................................................................................. 64 
IV.   CONCLUSION................................................................................................... 67 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Contemporary media accounts of most extant American uses of force, including 
the ongoing Iraqi crisis, are often rife with speculation about when American military 
involvement will end.1   But from an institutional perspective, there are many more 
interesting questions regarding the varying roles of Congress and the President in 
initiating and terminating wars.  For instance, following the pattern set by previous 
administrations, President Bush, rather than Congress, took the lead in initiating the war 
in Iraq.  But why was President Bush able to dominate the agenda at the initiation of 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Frederick Barton, et al., Should We Stay or Should We Go?, NY TIMES, January 19, 2005 
at A 19; David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Washington Memo; Hot Topic: How U.S. Might Disengage in Iraq ,  
NY TIMES, January 10, 2005, at A1. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art13
 A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution 3 
military hostilities?  Also, why do presidents sometimes seek congressional approval when 
they initiate certain wars but not others?  What is the likelihood that the President will 
take the lead in ending the current American military involvement in Iraq?  Are there 
specific circumstances that dictate when the President will take the lead in terminating a 
conflict and when the President will follow Congress’s lead?  As a practical matter, does 
the Constitution actually play a role in resolving any of these quandaries?   
 
Interestingly, although there is a plethora of legal scholarship on war powers, 
hardly any of it focuses on the various questions raised above regarding the interaction of 
the political branches in use of force incidents.  Rather, much of the scholarship tends to 
advance competing normative claims about the proper division of war powers.  On one 
side of the debate, pro-President scholars stress the importance of strength and flexibility 
in an executive that is not fettered in his foreign policy goals by parochial legislators. 2  On 
the other side of the debate, pro-Congress scholars argue that a legislative check on the 
President’s foreign policy actions encourages democratic accountability and effective 
scrutiny.3  While the gulf between these two camps in the war powers debate is quite 
extensive, they both seem to be in agreement on one point:  Congress is relatively 
impotent in war powers.4   
                                                 
2 John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War 
Powers, 84 CAL L. REV. 167, 303-304 (1996) (citing Federalist arguments for vesting war-making powers in 
a single individual, the independent president, because he would represent the entire nation and be able to 
act swiftly and decisively); see also  William Treanor, Fame, Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 695, 696 (1997) (listing those scholars that advocate a pro-presidential view of war 
powers).  More recently, debates have ensued as to whether the Vesting Clause of Article II gives the 
President broad residual powers in foreign affairs.   Cf. Curtis Bradley & Martin Flaherty, Executive Power 
Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 560-85 (2004) (suggesting that textual language and 
early history do not support theory that Vesting Clause provides broad residual power in the President); 
Saikrishna Prakash & Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 324-27  
(2001) (arguing for an expansive view of presidential power under the Vesting Clause). 
3 See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER 
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 205-06 (1996)(arguing that separation of powers ensures that each branch can 
limit the powers of the others, thereby saving the people from autocracy); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND 
RESPONSIBILITY  4-5 (1993) (citing both the slowing down of the war-making process and the democratic 
nature of the House as the Framers’ primary rationales for including the House in the decision to go to 
war.); W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 72 (1981) (listing the 
purposes behind the Framers’ division over war powers between Congress and the President).  Pro-Congress 
scholars point to the extensive constitutional language that seems to give Congress a prominent role in 
foreign affairs.   U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl.11.; ELY, supra note __ at 3 (outlining the Constitutional 
Convention’s debate and decision to vest in Congress the power to declare war); LOUIS FISHER, 
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 1 (1995) (describing Framers’ decision to vest the power to initiate war in 
Congress as a result of lessons learned from European nations).  
4 See generally Harold Koh, Why the President(Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the 
Iran Contra Affair, 97 YALE L. J. 1255 (1988); see also LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON 
WAR AND SPENDING (2000); see also  REVELEY, supra note __ at 134 (“To date, however, the legislators have 
proved unable to reassert themselves once and for all by establishing enduring channels for a Congressional 
voice in decisions about war and peace”); ELY, supra note __at 48 (“Since 1950, [Congress] realized, it had 
been dodging its constitutional duty to make the decision whether to commit American troops to combat.  
Instead it had been laying back, neither disapproving presidential military ventures nor forthrightly 
approving them, instead letting the president use troops wherever and whenever he wanted and waiting to 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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What is lacking in these debates, however, is a coherent theoretical account of 
how the President and Congress actually interact on war powers issues.  In other words, if 
Congress is so weak, why would the President ever seek congressional authorization to go 
to war?  Conversely, if the President is so powerful, why is Congress able to constrain his 
national security choices in certain circumstances, such as in terminating a war?  
 
This Article attempts to fill the gap in the war powers debate by presenting a 
theoretical framework that seeks to answer two related questions: (1) when, if ever, is the 
President likely to seek congressional approval before embarking on a use of force 
campaign?; and (2) when, if ever, is Congress likely to constrain the President’s decision 
to use force?  
 
Employing the tools and insights of positive political theory, this Article explores 
the division of war-making authority between the President and Congress by focusing on 
the domestic audience constraints that the political branches face in the context of an 
imminent military buildup or troop deployment.  This Article assumes that at the conflict 
initiation stage, the President enjoys an agenda setting advantage over Congress because 
he has the power to influence the domestic audience costs for going to war.  In other 
words, because the President has the exclusive ability to create and escalate an 
international crisis, he can effectively lock-in the other branches of government to his 
preferred course of military action knowing that any institutional actor that attempts to 
back out of the crisis will likely face punishment by a domestic audience.  Thus, by 
precipitating “back out” costs and a “rally around the flag effect” among the domestic 
audience, the President can effectively “constrain” the scope of Congress’s war-powers.  
 
Given the President’s apparent dominance over the crisis escalation agenda at the 
initiation of a conflict, however, why would the President ever seek Congress’s approval 
before going to war?  After all, the courts rarely ever intervene in separation of powers 
disputes regarding war-making authority and members of Congress who stand in the way 
of the President’s war-making decisions face significant electoral risks. 5  
 
The answer is that the President’s control over the war-making agenda is neither 
exclusive nor complete.  Indeed, although the President may dominate the “rally around 
the flag” effect at the conflict initiation stage, he has less control over the course and 
outcome of any specific war, such as the monetary and psychological costs of the war, how 
                                                                                                                                                 
see how the war in question played politically,” which resulted in the passage of the War Powers Act); Yoo, 
supra  note __, at 182 (pointing out that Congress has never sought to take available measures against 
presidents who refuse to comply with the War Powers Act); and KOH, supra note __ at 117 (Congress 
acquiesces to President in foreign affairs through “legislative myopia, inadequate drafting, ineffective 
legislative tools, or sheer lack of political will”). 
5 See, e.g., Richard Stoll, The Sound of Guns: Is there a Congressional Rally after U.S. Military Action, 
15 AMER. POL. Q. 223, 225 (1987); see also James Regens, Ronald Gaddie & Brad Lockerbie, The Electoral 
Consequences of Voting to Declare War, 39 J. CONFLICT RES. 168, 174-75 (1995) (showing that members of 
Congress who opposed the U.S. entry into WWI were less likely to be reelected than those who voted for 
entry but not finding statistically significant differences in Persian Gulf war and Mexican American war). 
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long the war will last, or whether failure or stalemate can be avoided.  As the President’s 
ex-ante beliefs of the risks of an unfavorable outcome increase, the President’s calculus of 
the risks involved in going to war without congressional authorization also change.   
 
This Article argues that this calculus is dependent on a two-level strategic 
interaction in which both levels of the interaction are interdependent.  At the domestic 
level, this Article argues that the President is likely to seek congressional authorization as 
a form of political insurance if he believes that there is a significant enough risk that the 
war will go wrong.  In other words, when there is a significant enough risk of military 
failure or stalemate, the President has an incentive to spread the costs of decision-making 
among other political actors in order to prevent those actors from subsequently exploiting 
the President’s misfortunes.  At the international level, the President also has an 
incentive to seek congressional authorization when the outcome of the war is uncertain in 
order to send a costly signal to the foreign adversary about the United States’ resolve to 
prosecute the conflict.  Both of these levels are interdependent because the perception 
that both political branches are not in accord in the prosecution of a conflict may 
embolden a foreign adversary, thereby increasing the chance of military failure or 
stalemate.  In sum, because of the significant domestic audience costs associated with 
failure or stalemate in foreign military engagements (including costly but ultimately 
successful conflicts), the President will be less likely to initiate conflict without 
congressional authorization unless he is assured of relatively rapid military success. 
 
Correspondingly, this theoretical model suggests that Congress also has an 
incentive to constrain the President’s war-making authority in the shadow of an 
unpopular military undertaking.  Indeed, presidents who embark on military adventures 
face an acute dilemma:  while the use of military force is likely to generate a favorable 
public response in the short run, costly or failed military adventures are also likely to 
generate a subsequent backlash by the domestic audience.  Thus, if the President is facing 
possible military failure or stalemate, members of Congress, especially those of the 
opposing party, are usually poised to take advantage of the President’s misfortunes to 
mobilize opposition to the President’s agenda.  On those occasions, members of Congress 
are able to deploy a variety of mechanisms to constrain the President’s war-making 
initiatives, including denial of funds for military engagements, use of procedural devices 
that restrict the scope of presidential decision-making, threats to derail the president’s 
political agenda, and occasionally the threat of impeachment.   The conventional wisdom 
often dismisses such legislative constraints, such as the War Powers Resolution, as being 
useless and purely symbolic. 6 This Article suggests that far from being useless as a 
constraint on the President’s authority, the War Powers Resolution is actually an 
ingenious piece of legislation that allows members of Congress to intervene selectively 
                                                 
6 See KOH, supra note __ at 39 (“[T]he resolution has… failed to prevent even the type of creeping 
escalation that it was expressly enacted to control”); ELY, supra note __ at 61 (describing the “bad aura” 
and general disrespect for the War Powers Resolution, which leads Courts to go out of their way to avoid 
enforcing it); BARBARA HINCKLEY, LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE: FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND THE MYTH 
OF THE ASSERTIVE CONGRESS 99 (1994) (“Decision making since the War Powers Act appears remarkably 
like the decision making before. . .”).   
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and strategically in war-making decisions once there are clear political payoffs for doing 
so.   
 
This Article also suggests that the role that public opinion plays in the separation 
of war powers between the President and Congress is strikingly different.  While the 
President tries to frame and shape public opinion on use of force decisions, Congress 
tends to react to public opinion.  Members of Congress, including those in the opposition, 
are aware that presidential popularity during an international crisis is often very relevant 
to their electoral fortunes.  When the President’s war initiatives are popular, members of 
Congress from both sides of the spectrum will often jump on the war bandwagon and 
support the President.  When public opinion turns against the President, however, 
members of Congress, including those in the President’s party, seem to be more willing to 
constrain the President’s initiatives.  The President, on the other hand, does not generally 
react to negative public opinion in his war-making initiatives.  Indeed, the President is 
aware that withdrawal of troops in the face of negative public opinion is likely to be 
construed as an admission of failure and incompetence.  Rather than follow the course of 
public opinion when the war is going badly, the President is more likely to entrench 
himself into a war and gamble that the course of the war (and public opinion) will change 
in his favor.   Thus, a presidential decision to withdraw troops from an ongoing 
international crisis in the absence of military victory is more likely to be the result of 
congressional intervention than a response to negative public opinion.  
 
  While the theoretical thrust of this Article is decidedly positive, it has significant 
implications for the normative scholarship on war powers.   Most of the normative 
critiques of presidential authority in war powers assume that government agencies or 
bureaucracies are empire builders that seek to maximize their institutional powers. 7  
These commentators assume that the President has an imperialistic agenda in the 
national security sphere and that Congress will be more proactive in its war-powers role if 
it is provided with better institutional tools.  The theoretical framework laid out in this 
Article suggests that as long as the President has control over the crisis escalation agenda, 
it is unlikely that more sophisticated institutional tools will significantly alter Congress’s 
war powers role.   After the President has escalated an international crisis and mobilized 
the domestic audience in favor of war, there is a strong tendency that Congress will follow 
suit and accede to the President’s wishes.  In other words, electoral payoff factors are 
more likely to influence the congressional role in war powers issues than empire building 
concerns.   Correspondingly, this model also refutes the notion that Congress is impotent 
in foreign affairs because it does not have adequate institutional tools to assert itself 
against the President.  In those instances where there is a discernible electoral payoff for 
constraining the President on war powers issues, Congress has been willing and able to do 
                                                 
7 See Daryl Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV.  915, 
915-17 (2005) (alluding to prevalence of empire-building approaches in the analysis of separation of 
powers).  
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so.8   Given the political incentives that members of Congress face on war powers issues, 
neither better institutional tools nor increased judicial intervention is likely to make 
much of a change to the current war powers landscape. 
 
 This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I presents a positive political theory of the 
war powers constitution by exploring the domestic constraints Congress and the President 
face in the context of imminent military hostilities.  This Part focuses on four key 
questions.  First, how does the President get to exercise dominion over the crisis 
escalation agenda before a conflict is initiated?  How does the President’s ability to 
dominate the escalation agenda influence Congress’s participation in the war powers 
debate? How does uncertainty about the outcome of a war influence the President’s 
decision to seek congressional authorization?  Finally, when is Congress likely to use 
devices, such as the War Powers Resolution, to constrain President’s war-making 
activities?  This Part shows that these four questions can be answered by a two-level game 
of domestic and international interaction in which both domestic audience costs and the 
President’s desire to signal resolve to a foreign adversary influence the actual division of 
war powers.  Part II tests this theory by focusing on four historical case studies of the 
modern use of force, including the 1982-1984 deployment in Lebanon, the 1983 
intervention in Grenada, the 1992-1993 humanitarian intervention in Somalia, and the 
2003 US-led military invasion of Iraq.  The results of these case studies largely support the 
theoretical model.  Lastly, Part III explores some of the implications of this theory for 
normative scholarship in war powers.  More specifically, this Part argues that many of the 
debates about Congress’s proper role in the War Powers Constitution may be misguided, 
since members of Congress do not act as empire builders when dealing with war powers 
issues, and may be averse to taking steps that increase their institutional power if taking 
such steps makes them electorally vulnerable.  Moreover, this Part also suggests that 
efforts to have the courts police the war powers constitution may ultimately prove to be 
fruitless if members of Congress do not have much of an incentive to assert these war 
powers themselves. 9 
 
 
I. A THEORY OF WAR-MAKING AUTHORITY 
 
This Part develops an argument that uses rational choice theory to explain the 
actual division of war-making authority between the President and Congress. 10  The core 
assumption underlying this theoretical approach is that the relevant institutional actors— 
                                                 
8 See James Lindsay, Congress and Foreign Policy: Why The Hill Matters, 107 POL. SC. Q. 607, 622-23 
(1992). 
9 See KOH, supra note __ at 148. 
10 For a useful surveys of rational choice theory, see RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
THE LAW (4th Ed. 1992); DANIEL FARBER & PHILLIP FRICKEY ,  LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION (1991).  For an application of rational choice theory to political branch interpretation of 
foreign affairs powers see John O. McGinnis,  Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War 
Powers: A Consequence of the Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers , 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 
206-08 (1993) 
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individual members of Congress and the President—act rationally to advance war powers 
decisions that are consistent with their preferences.  In other words, this approach 
assumes that all of these actors will pursue self-interested goals, that they will respond 
strategically to each other, and they will use institutional structures when necessary to 
advance their goals.  The argument also assumes that the preferences of both the 
President and the individual members of Congress are very heavily influenced by electoral 
concerns, and thus both are very sensitive to the preferences of the domestic political 
audience.  Finally, this argument assumes that the President is sensitive to the preferences 
of the domestic audience not just for electoral reasons, but because he believes a favorable 
domestic audience will help him advance his policy agenda.11  The first section develops 
this theory by spelling out the presidential advantage in framing domestic audience costs 
before the initiation of a conflict.  The second section suggests that uncertainty about the 
possible outcome of a conflict can influence the President’s decision to seek congressional 
authorization before going to war.   
 
A. The Early Executive Advantage: Exclusive Domination over the Crisis 
Escalation Agenda  
 
In November 2001, almost 16 months before he ordered the invasion of Iraq, 
President Bush explicitly threatened Saddam Hussein to come clean on Iraq’s alleged 
weapons of mass destruction program or else face the consequences. 12  When President 
Bush first uttered those words, he did not seem to be doing much more than sending a 
strong signal to Hussein that he should take the UN arms inspection program seriously.  
By fall 2002, however, the President’s warnings against the Iraqi regime had escalated and 
it appeared that President Bush was staking his political reputation on forcefully removing 
Hussein from power.13   When repeated UN inspections failed to disclose any new such 
weapons, and it appeared that the Iraqi authorities were not forthcoming in disclosing 
such weapons, President Bush followed through on his threat and ordered a full-scale 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003.14    
 
When President Bush originally made his threats against Iraq in late 2001, he was 
not bound to follow through on them by either domestic or international law.  
Nonetheless, by September 2002, public opinion polls seemed to show that a majority of 
                                                 
11 See DAVID P. AUERSWALD, DISARMED DEMOCRACIES 27 (2000) (arguing that even when failure 
does not endanger tenure in office, an executive would prefer international success to failure).  
12 See Bob Deans, Bush: Iraq may be Next , ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 27, 2001, at 1A (Bush 
demanded that Hussein comply with the United Nations or “face the consequences.”) 
13 See, e.g., George Bush, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Document, Vol. 38, at 1295 (2002) 
(“The policy of my government . . . is regime change—for a reason”); We Have a Duty to Every Worker . . . in 
America to Punish the Guilty, WASH. POST, September 9, 2002, at A14 (“It's a stated policy of this 
government to have a regime change. And it hasn't changed. And we'll use all tools at our disposal to do so. 
. . .”). 
14 David E. Sanger and John F. Burns, Threats and Responses: The White House; Bush Orders Start of 
War on Iraq; Missiles Apparently Miss Hussein, NY TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at A1 (describing the first hours of 
the Iraq War.) 
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Americans believed military action against Iraq was inevitable.15  Such public belief in a 
military response persisted even as key allies of the United States balked at supporting a 
UN Resolution that would authorize military action against Iraq.16  Indeed, Congress 
subsequently granted President Bush the authorization to take action in Iraq even before 
he had publicly made up his mind about whether he wanted to go to war.17   
 
Why did Bush’s threats against Iraq, non-binding as they were, carry such political 
weight?  One possible explanation relates to the expectations of the domestic audience 
during an international crisis.  Political scientists have argued that political leaders in 
democracies suffer from domestic audience costs if they renege on their threats. 18  
According to this argument, democracies have an advantage over autocratic regimes in 
signaling credible resolve in military engagements because democratic politicians suffer 
“audience costs” if they make threats that they subsequently fail to fulfill.19  Thus, one 
way to interpret the public response in the build-up to the Iraqi conflict is that the public 
was aware that neither the President nor Congress could really back out of the crisis 
without suffering significant electoral consequences.   
 
A much broader explanation of the President’s actions is that when he threatens a 
foreign adversary he is engaging in a two-level signaling game.  At the international level, 
as the political scientists have observed, when an elected executive issues such threats, he 
is essentially saying to the foreign adversary: “My resolve is high because as an elected 
official in a democracy the political costs of backing out of a publicly issued threat are 
high.” 20  At the domestic level, however, President is also sending a distinct signal to the 
other branches of government: “I have committed this country to a course of action by 
initiating this international crisis, and anyone who tries to get us to back out of this 
course of action (including the executive branch itself) will suffer significant domestic 
audience costs.” 21  In other words, the existence of domestic audience costs at the crisis 
                                                 
15 Richard Benedetto, President Gains Support for Military Action, USA TODAY, Sep. 18, 2002, at 
6A (Gallup poll revealed that seven out of ten Americans believed war with Iraq was inevitable in the next 
year.); Adam Clymer & Janet Elder, Poll Finds Unease on Terror Fight and Concerns About War on Iraq, 
NY TIMES, Sep. 8, 2002, at 1. 
16See  James M. Lindsay and Caroline Smith, Rally ‘Round the Flag: Opinion in the United States 
before and after the Iraq War, 21 BROOKINGS REVIEW 20, 22 (Summer 2003). 
17 Susan Milligan, Congress Gives Bush OK to Act Alone Against Iraq; Senate Follows House in Voting 
Strong Support , BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 11, 2002, at A1. 
18 See James Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes , 88 
AMER. POL. SC. REV. 577, 580 (1994) (arguing that a leader who backs down after “engaging the national 
honor” is likely to be seen as suffering greater humiliation the more he had escalated the conflict); Alastair 
Smith, International Crisis and Domestic Politics , 92 AMER. POL. SC. REV. 623, 632 (1998) (“Democratic] 
leaders are able to send credible messages because they mortgage their domestic political survival on their 
ability to honor those commitments”). 
19 See Fearon, supra note __ at 581-582.  
20 Fearon, supra note __ at 582; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. 
Siverson & Alastair Smith, An Institutional Explanation for the Democratic Peace, 93 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 
791, 794 (1999).  
21 As some commentators have noted, members of Congress who vote against a war risks electoral 
defeat.  See e.g., Stoll, supra note __ at 225. 
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escalation stage provides the President with a credible tool to coerce the other branches 
of government, especially Congress, to his preferred course of military action.    
 
Members of Congress, not only have to contend with possible “audience costs” if 
they try to resist the President’s war agenda at the initiation of a conflict, there are also 
positive political benefits for supporting the President in an international crisis:  the “rally 
around the flag” effect.22  The rally around the flag effect suggests that in the context of 
an international crisis, the public will rally around the President and the flag.23  Indeed, 
when there is an international event such as a war or terrorist attack, the initial patriotic 
impulse to rally around the flag gives the President a decisive boost in power and 
confidence.24  As the President’s public opinion polls soar, members of Congress often find 
it politically beneficial to piggyback on the President’s political momentum and do as he 
wishes.25  Thus, even before the first shot is fired, or the first aircraft carrier is dispatched, 
the President can act strategically and influence the political costs and benefits of 
intervention by the other branches of government.  
 
To be sure, it is not all members of Congress that will subscribe to the rally round 
the flag factor and support the President’s national security agenda.  Some members of 
Congress may oppose the President’s agenda for principled reasons regardless of the risks 
of subsequent punishment by a domestic audience.26  Others may make a strategic 
calculation that the President’s prosecution of the war is likely to go badly and hence try 
to put themselves in a position to exploit opportunistically the political spoils of the 
President’s misfortunes. 27  But as demonstrated later in this Article, this latter kind of 
calculation is highly risky because ordinarily the President has better information of the 
                                                 
22 See JOHN MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS, AND PUBLIC OPINION 48 (1973); see also  John R. O’Neal 
& Anna Lillian Bryan, The Rally Round The Flag Effect In U.S. Foreign Policy Crises, 1950-1985 , 17 POL. 
BEHAV. 379, 393-94 (1995) (finding that although the effect was far less than previously found when one 
analyzes only independently selected international crises, the rally ‘round the flag is significantly affected by 
the media’s coverage of the crisis); Brett Ashley Leeds & David R. Davis, Domestic Political Vulnerability and 
International Disputes , 41 J CONFLICT RES. 814, 816 (1997) (“The salient and potent danger of a foreign 
adversary quells domestic dissension and increases nationalist feelings and government support.  The ‘rally 
around the flag’ effect, a tendency discovered in the United States for public approval of the president to 
increase following involvement in major international events”). 
23 See Leeds & Davis, supra note __ at 814-15 (“Actions that serve to increase national pride and 
government support and provide the executive with an opportunity to demonstrate competence… might 
help a leader survive a period in which he or she may otherwise be vulnerable”). 
24 See John Mueller, Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnston, 1970 AM. POL. SC. REV.  18, 
21. 
25 HINCKLEY, supra note __, at 79-80.  
26 See FISHER, supra note __ at 117 (Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) opposed the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution, stating that “if we follow a course of action that bogs down thousands of American boys in Asia, 
the administration responsible for it will be rejected and repudiated by the American people.  It should be”); 
Threats and Responses; Senator Deplores Attack on Iraq, NY TIMES, March 20, 2003, at A20 (The senior 
member of the Senate, Robert Byrd of West Virginia, sets forth his opposition to the Iraq War).  
27 The tendency for legislators to exploit the political misfortunes of the Pre sident is discussed in 
detail in section ___ 
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likely outcome of a conflict than members of Congress. 28   In the end, a majority of 
members of Congress regardless of party affiliation tend to follow the President’s lead in 
the heat of an international crisis. 
 
This Article does not make any assumptions about what actually motivates the 
presidential decision to use force, such as whether the President factors in electoral 
concerns in his decision-making process.  What this Article assumes is that when he 
decides to use force for whatever reason, the President has a unique agenda setting 
advantage over Congress at the conflict initiation stage.   Some political scientists have 
speculated that American presidents may have an incentive to create an international 
crisis in order to divert attention from domestic problems. 29  Other commentators who 
have studied the diversionary war hypothesis have found no clear evidence between 
electoral cycles and the presidential decision to use force.30  This latter evidence makes 
sense if one assumes that the President is not able to easily transfer “rally around the flag” 
benefits to members of Congress from his own party.31  What the empirical evidence has 
shown, however, is that there is a significant correlation between the President’s 
popularity rating and the use of force.32   This result suggests that a favorable domestic 
audience may be important to the President independent of electoral cycle concerns.   As 
the political scientists Leeds & Davis argue, “Leaders who enjoy high public support are 
likely to find it easier to influence other political elites; they will have more success in 
implementing their programs as they meet with less resistance from actors within and 
outside the government.”33   
 
In any event, the question remains: what accounts for the unique advantage that 
the President enjoys in shaping domestic audience costs in the context of an international 
crisis?  The rest of this section points to two possible explanations: (1) the President’s 
constitutional role as the sole organ of communications in foreign affairs; and (2) the high 
public visibility and national significance of use of force issues. 
 
                                                 
28 See infra Section B. 
29 See Diana Richards et al., Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force, 37 J 
CONFLICT RES. 504 (1993); Patrick James and John O’Neal, The Influence of Domestic and International 
Politics on the President’s Use of Force , 35 J. CONF RES. 307 (1991); Charles Ostrom & Brian Job, The 
President and the Political Use of Force, 80 AM. POL. SC. REV. 541 (1986).  
30 See Benjamin Fordham, The Politics of Threat Perception: A Political Economy Model of US uses of 
force, 42 INT’L STUD. Q 567, 570  (1998) (“Aside from Stoll (1984), most empirical studies have found no 
significant electoral cycle in the use of force.” ) 
31 See James Campbell & Joe Sumners, Presidential Coattails in Senate Elections, 80 AM. POL. SC. 
REV.  513 (1990); see also  Paul Gronke, Jeffrey Koch & Matthew Wilson, Follow the Leader?  Presidential 
Approval, Presidential Support, and Representatives’ Electoral Fortunes, 65 J. POL. 785, 793 (2003). 
32 Lian Bradley & John Oneal,  Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion, 37 J 
CONFLICT RES. 277, 378-30 (1993); see also  John Mueller, Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnston, 64 
AM. POL. SC. REV. 18 (1970). 
33 Brett Leeds & David Davis, Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes, 41 J CONF 
RES. 814, 817 (1997).  
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  1.  The Sole Organ of Communications in Foreign Affairs  
 
The notion that the President is the sole organ of communication in foreign affairs 
is so uncontroversial that it has almost become a truism of American constitutional law.34  
The textual basis for this authority is not explicit, but courts and commentators have 
assumed that it is derived from the President’s power to appoint and receive 
ambassadors. 35  Nonetheless, in the same breadth that courts and commentators often 
mention the “sole organ” role, they are quick to point out that the President does not 
have the exclusive authority to conduct foreign policy.36  There is not much analysis, 
however, as to how the President’s organ of foreign communications role influences his 
ability to shape the national security agenda. 
 
One can view the President’s role in an international crisis as that of an agent 
reacting to events that have been thrust upon him.37  Interestingly, however, his role as 
the nation’s spokesman actually puts the President in a position to create or escalate an 
international crisis.  By issuing threats against a foreign adversary, the President is able to 
create an international crisis that might eventually require a military response.38  Because 
foreign states frequently rely on the President’s statements as representing the United 
States’ position on an issue, a presidential threat also carries extra weight in creating or 
amplifying an international crisis.  In addition, the domestic audience also takes its cue as 
to the existence and nature of an international crisis from the President’s statements.  
 
The President’s agenda setting power gives him the unique ability to shape 
domestic audience preferences for the use of force abroad.  In periods of international 
crisis such as when the nation faces a foreign threat, the public tends to rally behind a 
singular authority who symbolizes national unity.39  As commander in chief, the President 
serves as a “focal point of action” and embodies a united front against what the public 
perceives is a common menace.  The public turns to him for reassurance and protection 
                                                 
34 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 42 (1996) 
("That the President is the sole organ of official communication by and to the United States has not been 
questioned and has not been a source of significant controversy. Issues begin to burgeon when the President 
claims authority, as 'sole organ', to be more than an organ of communication and to determine also the 
content of the communication..."); Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the 
Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1151 n.431 (2000) ("Congress has not seriously doubted that the 
President is the sole organ of communication with foreign governments."). 
35 See HENKIN supra  note __at 41-42. 
36 See HENKIN supra note __at 42-43 (“[I]ssues begin to burgeon when the President claims the 
authority, as sole organ, to be more than an organ of communication and also to determine the content of 
the communication”);  see also Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 961 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, Goldwater 
v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated by 444 U.S. 996 (1979) ("While the President may be the 
sole organ of communication with foreign governments, he is clearly not the sole maker of foreign policy."). 
37 See discussion at supra notes __ 
38 See Fearon, supra note ___at 577. 
39 See Michael Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidence 
May not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 844 (1996) (“[T]he president can 
establish a "focal point" around preferred public policies”). 
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and they expect—indeed, they demand—that he respond by taking appropriate and 
decisive action against the perceived threat.   In these times, the public expects Congress 
to give the President the free reign to tackle the foreign menace as he sees fit.40 
 
 The President also has the ability frame the crisis in a manner that is most likely to 
mobilize popular support for the use of force.  For instance, polls usually indicate that 
Americans are more reluctant to support the use of force if the sole military objective is to 
impose political change on another country.41   In such circumstances, the risk of 
significant division of public opinion on the wisdom of the war increases, and so does the 
chance of having a protracted and expensive conflict with a significant loss of lives. 42  
However, foreign policy goals that involve curbing foreign aggression or a perceived 
external threat enjoy significant popular support.43  Through his sole organ of foreign 
communications role, the President is in the unique position to frame a potential use of 
force in a manner that is most likely to galvanize public support.  Because the public 
perceives the President as having access to superior information as to the nature of an 
international crisis, they are more likely to buy the President’s position at the conflict 
initiation stage that a particular use of force is necessary to contain foreign aggression, 
even if subsequent developments call that motive into question.44 
 
In their actions of voters, citizens are also sensitive to United States’ position in  
the international community as a global superpower with superior military capabilities. 45  
They expect that in a crisis the President should be able to deploy force decisively and 
vindicate America’s international security commitments.  The American public may be 
even more willing than citizens in other democracies to punish domestic institutional 
actors that are not willing to use effective military force to protect the country’s image 
                                                 
40 See MARC E. SMYRL, CONFLICT OR CODETERMINATION?: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE 
POWER TO MAKE WAR 133 (1988)   (“Experience suggests that presidential military initiatives will be 
initially well received by the American public . . . Expressing strong opposition to such initiatives in their 
early stages, thus, is likely to be politically unrewarding for members of Congress.”).  
41 See Bruce Jentleson, The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of 
Military Force, 36 INT’L STUD. Q.  49, 49-54 (1992). 
42 See id.  
43 See id. 
44 See John Mueller, Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnston, 64 AM. POL. SC. REV. 18, 21 
(1970) (“Invariably, the popular response to a President during international crisis is favorable, regardless of 
the policies he pursues.”) (quoting  NELSON POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 25 (1964)); see also 
CECIL V. CRABB & PAT M. HOLT, INVITATION TO STRUGGLE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN 
POLICY18 (1980) (“[O]nce a President has made a decision in foreign affairs that becomes known to the 
public, he automatically receives the support of at least 50 percent of the American people, irrespective of 
the nature of the decision”). 
45 See James Meernik, Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force, 38 INT’L 
STUD. Q. 121, 129-30 (1994) (“Just as presidents believe that is in their interest to maintain credibility 
internationally, they appear also to believe that their domestic political reputation is dependent in part on 
their willingness to use force . . .  The American public appears to expect presidents to take strong action 
when the nation’s interests or its citizens are threatened to preserve U.S. power and prestige.  Given the 
enormous and formidable American military arsenal, the public has generally assumed that an effective 
application of force is readily available and easily utilized option in times of crisis.”).  
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abroad.46   Thus, when the President takes the initiative to assert America’s military 
prerogative in a crisis, members of Congress may even feel more constrained than their 
legislative counterparts abroad in acting as a counterweight to the President’s authority.   
 
The United States’ unique stature as a global superpower also suggests that the 
initial impulse of the American public to support the President at the beginning of an 
international crisis is somewhat rational.  The public understands that when a President 
initiates an international crisis by issuing threats against a foreign adversary, he not only 
stakes his political reputation but also that of the United States in the particular military 
endeavor.47  But this high stakes gambit has significant implications for the domestic 
audience: if the President subsequently admits error in his judgment and backs out from a 
rapidly escalating international crisis, he not only signals incompetence by his 
administration but also incompetence and the lack of credibility by the United States.  
 
 2.  The High Public Visibility of Use of Force Issues  
 
In the eyes of the members of Congress, not all policies or issues are of equal 
political relevance.  Unlike the President, members of Congress are more apt to be 
politically sensitive to those issues that are most salient to their local constituencies and 
pay less attention to those of national significance.48  Beyond the explicitly parochial 
incentives that attract them to local issues, members of Congress also face acute 
collective action problems in attempting to address issues of national importance.49  
Because the potential political benefits of addressing issues of national concerns are likely 
to accrue to the institution of Congress as a whole, no one member may have an 
incentive to invest the resources to understand and claim responsibility for a national 
policy issue.  Consequently, members of Congress are likely to be unwilling to expend 
their resources and time on national issues, especially those issues that do not have a clear 
electoral payoff.  Moreover, members of Congress are particularly susceptible to issues 
that have rent-seeking opportunities—issues were the costs to the public are dispersed 
but the benefits to interest groups are concentrated.50   
                                                 
46 This might explain why the United States is more routinely an initiator rather than target of the 
use of force.  Dan Reiter & Allan C. Stam, III, Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory, 92 AM. POL. SC. REV. 
377, 379 (1998) (“States with a greater objective chance of victory will select themselves into the 
population of war participants by launching wars, whereas states with a lower objective probability of victory 
are selected into the population of targets of attack”). 
47 See Fearon, supra note __at 578.  
48 See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 132, 144-45 (1999) (observing that constituent commitments often prevent members of 
Congress from acting collectively to advance their institutional interests). 
49 See id.; see also Steve Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. 
REV. 23, 35 (1994) (arguing that Congress’s collective action problems support the argument for a unitary 
executive). 
50 See WILLIAM HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL 
ACTION 109-110 (2003). The latter phenomenon, which social scientists dub “rational ignorance,” is most 
prevalent when the payoff to the general public from investing the resources necessary to understand an 
issue is not worth the costs.  John McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s 
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Unlike many rent-seeking issues, however, issues like war and foreign terrorist 
threats are not usually plagued by the problem of rational ignorance and interest group 
politics.   Indeed, the perceived costs and benefits of engaging in war or combating foreign 
terrorist threats are widely distributed.  Correspondingly, information dissemination about 
war and foreign terrorist threats in the national media is significantly high.  For instance, 
during both the 2003 and 1991 invasions of Iraq, almost all media outlets dedicated a 
significantly high amount of airtime to the conflicts, often providing live round the clock 
coverage of developments in the battlefield.51   Of course, there is no guarantee that the 
quality of information that the public receives about an international crisis is particularly 
reliable, but the relevant consideration is not necessarily the quality of the information 
but the level of public engagement with the issue.   
 
The high public visibility of war as an issue has significant implications for 
congressional willingness to assert its authority on national security issues.  It is not that 
such highly visible political issues do not provide significant electoral payoffs to members 
of Congress; they do, but the direction of the payoff is most closely related to the sway of 
public opinion.  But the President is most often in the driver’s seat when it comes to 
mobilizing public opinion in favor of initiating a war.  Thus, he is usually able to dictate 
the direction of the electoral payoff for members of Congress in an international crisis. 52  
The widespread availability of war and other security issues on regular news and 
entertainment-oriented programs also tends to amplify the “rally around the flag” effect, 
mobilizing support for presidential decisions to use force.53   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery,  90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 503 (1995) (“[P]ublic choice theory has shown that 
cohesive groups, called special interests, may be able to exercise political power out of proportion to their 
numbers to obtain resources and status for themselves . . . In contrast, since the diffuse citizenry has little 
leverage on centralized democracy, it is rationally ignorant of much government policy”); see also  OLSON, 
RISE AND DECLINE, supra note __, at 25-26 (discussing how typical voters are "rationally ignorant"). 
Discussing the typical voter, Olson notes:  
The gain to such a voter from studying issues and candidates until it is clear what vote is 
truly in his or her interest is given by the difference in the value to the individual of the "right" 
election outcome as compared with the "wrong" outcome, multiplied by the probability a change in 
the individual's vote will alter the outcome of the election. Since the probability that a typical 
voter will change the outcome of the election is vanishingly small, the typical citizen is usually 
"rationally ignorant" about public affairs.  
Id. 
51 For an account of how pervasive media coverage of war events has become see MATTHEW 
BAUM, SOFT NEWS GOES TO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NEW MEDIA 
AGE (2003). 
 
52As some commentators have noted, one of the most unique features of the modern plebiscitary 
president is his ability to mobilize public opinion in favor of nationally-oriented policy issues.  See Moe & 
Howell, supra note __at 145-46; Fitts, supra note __ at 890 (“[O]ne of the most important devices of a 
modern president is his ability to mobilize support through the bully pulpit -- to take advantage of his 
unitary and visible position as a ‘focal point.’”)   
53See generally MATTHEW BAUM, SOFT NEWS GOES TO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NEW MEDIA AGE xii (2003). 
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B.  Uncertainty About the Use of Force Outcomes and the Scope of the Two-Level 
Interaction 
 
Although the President enjoys significant informational and framing advantages at 
the conflict initiation stage, the extent of that advantage starts to dissipate during the 
course of an actual conflict.  The President, like any war leader, usually has less than 
perfect information about the variables that affect the outcome of a conflict, such as the 
foreign adversary’s level of resolve and the expected costs of the conflict.54   Once a 
conflict begins in earnest, however, the President, Congress, the foreign adversary, and 
the American public can now evaluate better both the costs and objectives of the military 
engagement.  This new information by Congress and the domestic audience can alter 
significantly the President’s dominance of the crisis escalation agenda. 
 
  Assume, for instance, that the American public and Congress get new 
information about the actual costs and objectives of a conflict that differs significantly 
from the original estimates given to them by the President; it is likely that their initial 
enthusiasm for the use of force will wane. This learning process is the source of the 
President’s dilemma: although he might be able to create easily a short-term rally in 
public support at the initiation of a conflict, he is unlikely to sustain that rally if there is 
military failure or stalemate.  Thus, a President who is thinking of initiating an 
international crisis needs to consider not only the positive domestic audience reaction at 
the early stages of a conflict but also the likelihood of a domestic backlash if the war goes 
wrong.   In many respects, this uncertainty about the outcome of foreign military 
engagements has many ramifications for the President’s decision as to whether to seek 
congressional authorization before going to war.  
 
First, a point of clarification: as used here, military failure does not necessarily 
entail the outright defeat of the United States by a foreign adversary.  Indeed, given the 
significant military and resource advantage that the United States has over almost every 
other country, the risk of outright defeat of the United States in a foreign military 
engagement is relatively trivial.   Rather the notion of military failure or success as used 
here depends on three factors: costs (both in human lives and resources), time, and the 
nature of the military objectives.  All else equal, the American public will likely perceive a 
military campaign as a failure if: (1) the conflict is protracted and results in high human 
casualties; and (2) the primary objective of the war does not involve curbing foreign 
aggression.55  Thus, if one were to develop a typology of United States military outcomes, 
at one end of the spectrum representing classic military success would be a swift and 
relatively costless effort to restrain foreign aggression.  At the other end of the spectrum 
representing classic military failure would be a protracted and costly effort to impose 
                                                 
54 See Fearon, supra note __ at 583. 
55 In the latte r case, the empirical evidence shows that the American public is generally more 
supportive of using force to restrain a country from aggression than using force to impose political change in 
another country.  See Bruce Jentleson , The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the 
Use of Force, 36 INT’L STUD. Q 49 (1992).  
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political change on a foreign country.  In the middle (ranging from success to failure) 
would be a swift and non-costly effort in a mixed-motives war (both curbing foreign 
aggression and internal political change), a protracted and costly effort to curb foreign 
aggression, a swift and quick effort to achieve internal political change only, and a 
protracted and costly mixed-motives war. 
 
 
TABLE 1 
A Spectrum of Possible Outcomes in American Foreign Military Engagements 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Success       Failure 
 
 Swift and non-costly war curbing foreign aggression>Swift and non-costly war 
involving mixed motives (both curbing foreign aggression and imposing political 
change)>Protracted and costly war curbing foreign aggression>Swift and non-
costly war imposing internal political change only>Protracted and costly war 
involving mixed motives (both curbing foreign aggression and imposing political 
change)>Protracted and costly war imposing internal political change only. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Where the outcome of a military conflict is likely to fit within the spectrum  
makes a difference as to whether the President will decide to seek congressional 
authorization.  As explained in the next two sections, the President’s ex ante belief that a 
conflict is likely to fit towards the failure end of the spectrum increases the likelihood that 
he will seek congressional authorization before going to war.   Moreover, the proximity of 
time between a previous failed military engagement and a presidential decision to use 
force also affects Congress’s willingness to constrain the President’s national security 
agenda.  In this context, the President’s and Congress’s calculus depends on a two level 
game of domestic and international interaction.   Both levels of this interaction are 
interdependent because a perceived disagreement between the President and Congress 
over the use of force may bolster the resolve of a foreign adversary, thereby increasing the 
chance of military failure.   
 
1. The Domestic Level: Buying Political Insurance in Wars with Uncertain 
Outcomes  
 
 Introducing a certain degree of uncertainty about the outcome of a military 
engagement can radically change the separation of powers landscape.  Since neither 
Congress nor the President is likely to know with complete certainty the outcome of any 
war in advance, they are likely to position themselves to exploit any political 
opportunities that become available as they gain more information about the probable 
outcome of the war.  Just as presidents may find it useful to exploit their institutional 
advantage at the conflict initiation stage to mobilize political support for their agenda, 
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there are also opposition politicians in Congress who are willing to exploit the President’s 
military failure to mobilize political opposition to his agenda.56  When the war goes well, 
these opposition figures in Congress may be content to bask in the President’s glory, but 
when things wrong they are likely to sing a different tune.    
 
 Because of the downside political risks associated with military failure, the 
President often has to factor in his ex-ante beliefs about the likely outcome of a conflict in 
deciding whether to seek congressional authorization.  Although he may be able to 
initiate conflict on his own without much opposition from Congress, the incentives of 
members of Congress (especially those in the opposition) are likely to change as the war 
progresses and casualties mount.  This consideration leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: In circumstances where the President is uncertain about the 
prospects of rapid military success, he is likely to resort to congressional 
authorization in order to spread the political costs of decision-making among 
other domestic political actors.   
 
  In this hypothesis, the proxy for whether the President is uncertain about the 
prospects of immediate military success involves the scale and the announced period of 
the deployment.  All else equal, if the President announces a significant military 
deployment (let us say over 20,000 troops) for a significant period of time (longer than 3 
months), he is likely signaling a “high risk” military engagement. 
 
  The President’s decision to seek congressional authorization as a form of political 
insurance is in large part driven by two considerations regarding the potential political 
costs of a failed military engagement.  First, when a President mobilizes the domestic 
audience in an international crisis, he not only “locks in” Congress to a specific military 
response, he also “locks in” himself.57  Therefore, the President usually does not have 
much political flexibility in backing out of a military engagement after he has initiated it 
even if he subsequently revises his beliefs about the likely outcome.   Second, the 
domestic audience costs for a failed military engagement without congressional 
authorization may be subject to a cascading effect.  In other words, the more unpopular 
                                                 
56 See Todd Allee & Paul Huth, Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of 
International Disputes , 46 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RES. 754, 758 (2002) (“The strategic behavior of political 
opposition:  In all political systems, there are political elites who seek to remove the current leadership and 
assume positions of political power themselves. ….. Furthermore, although the threat or use of military 
force is likely to generate short term domestic support, costly or failed attempts at military coercion will also 
mobilize domestic opposition.”) 
 
57 See James Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs, 41 J. 
CONFLICT RES. 68, 70 (1997) (“Tying hands signals typically works by creating audience costs that the 
leadership would suffer due to the reaction of domestic political audiences to a perceived failure in the 
management of foreign policy”); see also Kenneth Schultz, Do Democratic Institutions Constraint or Inform? 
Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War, 53 INT. ORG. 233, 236-37 (1999) (“When a 
threat generates large audience costs, there is a strong possibility that the government intends to---indeed, 
has to—carry through on that threat”).  
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the prosecution of a failed military engagement, the greater the chance of increased 
congressional resistance, and in turn the greater the likelihood that the President will lack 
the political momentum to withstand such congressional resistance.  Moreover, 
opposition members of Congress will be poised not only to blame the President for 
military failure, but also for embarking on a military campaign in the first place without 
congressional authorization.  
 
At first blush, the President’s calculus of whether to go alone seems rather 
straightforward:  If the war goes well, he gains considerable political momentum for his 
political agenda without having to share the political spoils of victory; if it goes bad, he 
provides easy and potentially devastating ammunition to his political opponents.   
Therefore, absent the seemingly vain impulse of a president who desires to take exclusive 
credit for military victories, we would ordinarily expect the President to seek 
congressional approval for all uses of force.  But the President’s decision-making process is 
not likely to be that simple.  A president who seeks legislative consent before going to war 
may face other significant risks such as the legislative imposition of burdensome 
substantive and procedural restraints on how the actual war is conducted, premature 
disclosure of secret or confidential military plans by members of Congress, and the 
possibility of outright rejection of his request by Congress. 58   Indeed, members of 
Congress, aware of the potential political spoils that may be available in a military 
engagement, may have an incentive to impose seemingly onerous reporting, spending, and 
consultation requirements on the President as a condition for providing congressional 
approval.  
 
The President’s dilemma is not as bad as it seems, however.   Although the 
President and Congress may both face uncertainty about the likely outcome of a military 
engagement, the level of uncertainty is hardly symmetrical.  In other words, the President 
is almost always likely to possess better information about the likely outcome of a military 
engagement than members of Congress. 59  Given this informational asymmetry, the 
President can at the outset present evidence about the factors that affect the outcome of 
the war, such as motive and costs, in a manner that is most likely to win congressional 
support.  The President may thus often get the kind of congressional authorization he 
wants for military engagements without too many strings attached.  
 
Of course, in selling the war, the President may have an incentive to exaggerate 
(or understate) his beliefs about the expected costs and objectives of the war.  As the war 
progresses and members of Congress learn about the true costs or objectives of the 
conflict, however, they can revise their judgments about the political benefits/costs of 
supporting the President and try to position themselves accordingly.  Indeed, risk-averse 
                                                 
58 See James Lindsay & Randall Ripley, How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy, in 
CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL 17-35(Ripley & Lindsay, Ed. 
2004); Louis Fisher, Congressional Checks on Military Initiatives, 109 POL. SC. Q. 739, 757 (1994). 
59 Terry Moe & William Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, supra note __ at 132; 
see also HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION, supra note __ at 102-03. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution 20 
members of Congress may actually prefer that the President go solo without consulting 
them because it gives them the flexibility to jump on the rally around the flag bandwagon 
if things go well, or to sharpen their swords and distance themselves politically from the 
President if things go badly.   
 
In other contexts, members of Congress may try to use the informational 
asymmetry to their advantage: “I did support the war initially given the information I 
originally received about the objectives and costs of the war being x, but if I had known 
then what I know now—that the real objectives and costs of the war were really y—I 
would not have supported it.”60   Indeed, efforts by members of Congress to disclaim prior 
support for wars that subsequently became unpopular are very common, but in such 
circumstances the members of Congress often have an incentive to overstate the extent 
of their prior ignorance.61 
 
In any event, notwithstanding the President’s informational advantages, his 
decision to seek congressional authority before going to war is not costless.  Indeed, in 
many circumstances, he may seek to obtain the reassurance that congressional approval is 
clearly forthcoming before he formally seeks congressional consent.62  In other 
circumstances, he may believe that the chance of military success is high enough that he 
does not need the kind of political insurance that congressional authorization affords.  
This consideration leads to the second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  The President is likely to go to war without congressional 
authorization when the expected costs of a war are low and the likelihood 
of victory is high. 
 
This second hypothesis is obviously the corollary to the first one discussed above.  
Congressional authorization provides a form of political insurance for the President in 
which he alone does not get to bear the possible downside costs of military failure.  In 
situations where the President is fairly sure of rapid military success, however, such as 
when the foreign adversary is known to lack either the resources or resolve to prosecute a 
war against the United States, he will not need the protection of political insurance.  In 
such circumstances, the President is likely to prefer complete agenda control over the 
prosecution of the war, knowing that when the war is terminated on his terms he is surely 
going to reap the benefit of a positive domestic audience reaction.  From the President’s 
perspective, congressional input in such “little wars” can be counterproductive because it 
is likely to decrease the likelihood of immediate victory.   In other words, without the 
                                                 
60 See ELY, supra  note __, at 47 (describing Congress’ “backhanded” authorization of the Vietnam 
war, done so ambiguously that if anything went wrong, it could pin responsibility for the war on the 
President.)  
61 See id. at 19-21. 
62 See John Zaller, Strategic Politicians, Public Opinion, and the Gulf Crisis, in TAKEN BY STORM: THE 
MEDIA, PUBLIC OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE GULF WAR  266(Lance Bennett & David 
Paletz, Eds. 1994) (“Bush made the request [for congressional approval only after . . . he was almost certain 
to receive Congressional endorsement”).  
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element of surprise that unilateral action affords, the President will be constrained in his 
ability to develop a military strategy that minimizes the loss of casualties in little wars.  
 
 If the downside risks of possible military failure or stalemate are significant enough 
even with the element of surprise, however, the President will likely forego the benefit 
that unilateral action provides.  Indeed, the element of surprise may actually be 
counterproductive in high stakes military engagements because the domestic audience 
may not necessarily be prepared for the significant casualties or loss of lives that such 
engagements entail.   In such high stakes conflicts, the President will likely choose to 
escalate the crisis gradually in order to condition the American public and Congress to 
the possibility of significant war casualties and financial commitments.  Moreover, a 
gradual escalation strategy gives the President the opportunity to observe and measure 
the level of public support for war before he crosses a critical threshold where backing out 
of the use of force is not a politically feasible option.  
 
 While the foregoing discussion focuses primarily on the President’s incentives to 
seek congressional authorization, the factors involved in a high stakes military 
engagement also affect congressional willingness to constrain the President.  At the 
conflict initiation stage, the President usually has the ability to influence the domestic 
audience costs in a manner that makes congressional approval of his war agenda likely.   
However, if the President is already involved in a costly military engagement, or has 
recently just concluded a failed military engagement, the public appetite for the use of 
force is likely to diminish.  In such situations, members of Congress have an incentive to 
capitalize on the shift in public opinion and oppose the President’s agenda.  This 
consideration leads to the third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Congress will most likely act to constrain the President’s war-
making agenda in the shadow of a recent politically unpopular use of force. 
 
In this context, the shadow of recent uses of force refers not only to  
recently concluded wars but also the escalation of ongoing wars.  All else equal, the 
domestic audience will generally disfavor involvement in foreign military engagements in 
the period following a war with significant casualties. 63  In these situations, members of 
Congress, especially those in opposition, will likely take advantage of the unpopularity of 
the war to constrain the presidential use of force.64   Of course, members of Congress may 
                                                 
63See Charles Ostrom & Brian Job, The President and the Political Use of Force , 80 AM. POL. SC. REV. 
541, 548 (1986) (“The greater involvement in a ‘shooting war, the longer will be the period following the 
war in which the public will resist any further or additional involvement that might lead to U.S. casualties.  
It would be unwise for the president to consider undertakings with the risk of additional casualties, because 
of the lingering resistance to foreign involvement that follows such outbreaks of war.” ); Patrick James & 
John O’Neal, The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President’s Use of  Force ,  35 J. 
CONFLICT RES. 307, 313 (1991) (“[I]n periods following U.S. involvement in a war, public sentiment will 
reduce the president’s propensity to use force.”). 
64 See MARC SMRYL, CONFLICT OR CODETERMINATION 137 (1988) (When U.S. involvement ….. 
continues, the likelihood of Congressional action can increase if public opposition to military action 
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not have the ability to curb directly the presidential deployment of troops, but they can 
make the presidential exercise of the use of force much more costly by cutting off funds, 
by invoking statutory consulting and reporting requirements, or by threatening the 
President with impeachment.65 
 
The most obvious institutional device at Congress’s disposal for constraining the 
presidential use of force is the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”).66  Passed in 1973 over 
President Nixon’s veto, the WPR provides certain procedures that the President has to 
comply with before he introduces forces into foreign hostilities.   Ever since its passage, 
legal commentators of various stripes have dismissed the WPR as a toothless piece of 
legislation.67  These critics focus on what seems to be a severe loophole in the reporting 
requirements of section 4.68  More specifically, they usually point out that since only 
section 4(a)(1) triggers the time limit in section 5(b), which requires the termination of 
hostilities after sixty to ninety days, 69 the termination requirements of section 5(b) can be 
easily evaded.70   In other words, a president who wants to evade section 5(b)’s time limits 
can simply report that a deployment falls under sections 4(a)(2) or 4(a)(3), which do not 
have automatic termination requirements, rather than section 4(a)(1).  Indeed, of the 
over 110 uses of force that have been reported under section 4 since the WPR was 
enacted, only once has section 4(a)(1) been cited—by President Ford in the 1975 seizure 
of the SS Mayaguez.71  Thus, as a practical matter, Congress may often have to build a 
veto-proof majority to force the President to terminate a use of force.   The critics of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
develops”); James Meernik, Congress, the President, and the Commitment of the U.S. Military,  20 LEGIS. STUD. 
Q 377, 383 (1995) (“When public support for a major use of military force is not forthcoming, Congress will 
likely smell blood and attempt to place constraints on the executive’s ability to further commit the nation”).  
65 See generally James Lindsay & Randall Ripley, How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy , 
in CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL 17-35(Ripley & Lindsay, Ed. 
2004).   
66 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548).  
67 HINCKLEY, supra note __ at 99-100; KOH, supra note __ at 39-40; 128; LOUIS FISHER, 
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 132 (1995); MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 103-07 
(1990). 
68 Section 4 requires the President to submit a report to Congress within forty-eight hours after any 
troops are deployed: (1) “into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated,” 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1); (2) “into the territory, airspaces, or waters of a foreign nation,” 
id.  § 1543 (a)(2); or (3) “in numbers which substantially enlarge” American troops that have already been 
deployed, id.  § 1543 (a)(3).  Section 3 requires that the President consult with Congress “in every possible 
instance” before he introduces United States troops into foreign hostilities.  Id. § 1542. 
69 Section 5(b) requires that any use of force under section 4(a)(1) be terminated within sixty to 
ninety days unless Congress authorizes such use or extends the termination deadline.  50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).  
Finally, section 5(c) requires the President to remove troops at any time if Congress orders him do so by 
concurrent resolution.  Id. § 1544(c).  The constitutional validity of this latter provision is questionable in 
light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  See Phillip Trimble, The War 
Powers Twenty Five Years Later, 3 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 187 (1997) (discussing the 
constitutionality of section 5(c) under Chadha). 
70 See KOH, supra note ___at 126-127; ELY, supra  note ___ at 49 (describing “pattern of 
presidential evasion”). 
71See HINCKLEY, supra note ___ at 86. 
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WPR argue that this loophole transforms the WPR into a symbolic statute that does little 
to enhance Congress’s war powers authority.72    
 
 Contrary to the received wisdom, this Article argues that the WPR is actually an 
ingenious statutory instrument that enables members of Congress to monitor the political 
pulse of a war and intervene strategically.  While the critics are probably correct that the 
WPR has not proven to be a very effective instrument for enhancing Congress’s overall 
institutional prerogative, it has proven much more effective in giving members of 
Congress the opportunity to harness the political benefits of the use of force without 
bearing much of the downside costs.  More specifically, the WPR allows members of 
Congress to remain agnostic and not invoke its provisions if the public momentum seems 
to favor the presidential use of force, but then invoke it selectively otherwise.   Thus, the 
WPR can act conveniently as a sword when a war turns ugly and there are political 
benefits for constraining presidential authority, and act as a shield at other times when 
intervention might seem politically imprudent. 
 
Furthermore, the ability of Congress to invoke the WPR selectively increases the 
President’s political insurance costs.  In other words, if the President refuses to seek 
congressional approval for a use of force that subsequently becomes unpopular, members 
of Congress can capitalize on the President’s misfortunes by pointing out that he 
deliberately ignored a statutory scheme that was already in place.  Thus, all else equal, the 
President has a greater incentive to seek congressional authorization for the use of force 
given the existence of the WPR than he would otherwise. 
  
From an electoral perspective, the WPR’s reporting, consulting, and constraining 
provisions serve a variety of important purposes.  Section 4’s reporting requirements 
compel the President to disclose any information about all uses of force, which includes 
uses of force that might otherwise be conducted surreptitiously.73   By making such actions 
public, Congress has an opportunity to gauge the public response to the use of force and 
decide whether congressional intervention would be politically desirable.  Moreover, the 
termination requirements under section 5(c) also give Congress a ready-made statutory 
framework to repudiate the President’s use of force decision when it becomes politically 
desirable to do so.   Although Congress could in theory repudiate the President’s use of 
force without such a provision, such as by threatening to cut-off funds, the very existence 
of section 5(c) is likely to influence the President’s calculus of whether to ignore or 
accommodate congressional preferences in the first instance.  As one commentator has 
noted, “even if the [WPR] clock does not tick on the sixty to ninety day deadline, 
executive officials behave as though it does.”74  In other words, although presidents tend 
                                                 
72 See KOH, supra note __at 126-127; ELY, supra note __ at 49 (concluding that the War Powers 
Resolution “has not worked” due to loopholes and Congress’ unwillingness to close them). 
73 See David Auerswald & Peter Cowhey, Ballotbox Diplomacy: The War Powers Resolution and the 
Use of Force, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 505, 509 (1997).   
74 LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 133 (1995). 
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to routinely disclaim the applicability of the WPR, they nonetheless seem to be wary of 
ignoring its provisions.  
 
Finally, the critics are correct that the loophole in section 4(a)(1) of the WPR will 
often allow the President to evade the automatic termination requirements of section 
5(b).75  But it is not clear that a mandatory termination requirement would be in the 
electoral interests of members of Congress.  Such a requirement is likely to shift many of 
the electoral risks associated with the use of force from the President to Congress.  For 
instance, if there were an automatic termination requirement and for some reason 
Congress refuses to extend the period after the time limit expires under section 5(b) and 
the war goes wrong, the public is likely to blame the individual members of Congress who 
declined to vote for an extension rather than the President.76  If, on the other hand, 
Congress does grant an extension and the war goes wrong, some of the blame that will be 
leveled at the President will also be leveled at those members of Congress who voted for 
an extension.  Many commentators may argue that this form of political burden-sharing is 
desirable from the perspective of the American public,77 but it is far from obvious as to 
whether it would be desirable for members of Congress subject to electoral constraints.   
 
 In any event, during a costly and unpopular war, or in the shadow of a recent 
unpopular use of force, Congress has shown both its ability and willingness to intervene in 
use of force decisions.  Indeed, as the case studies in Part II reveal, members of Congress 
have often used the WPR selectively in constraining the presidential use of force in 
various politically unpopular conflicts. 
 
One significant caveat:  in deciding whether to constrain the presidential use of 
force, different members of Congress face varying incentives.  Members of the President’s 
party may have an incentive to support the Presidential use of force even in the face of 
waning public support since the President’s electoral fortunes may be closely tied to their 
own.  Opposition members of Congress, on the other hand, have an incentive to support 
the President only when there are “rally around the flag” benefits associated with the use 
of force.78   Given these varying incentives, we might expect congressional resistance to 
the President’s agenda to increase when the opposition is the majority party in Congress.  
Some political scientists have actually documented a relationship between the partisan 
                                                 
75 See, e.g., KOH, supra note __at 126-127. 
76 See James Meernik, Congress, the President and the Commitment of the U.S. Military, 20 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q  at 379 (“[I]f Congress places limitations on the President, it may prevent the nation form taking a 
correct, aggressive, course and thus it may be blamed by the public for interfering with the commander-in-
chief”). 
77See e.g., ELY supra note __ at 47 (“[T]he prerogatives of congressmen aren’t what’s at stake here.  
What is at stake—and was so understood by the framers—is the judgment that no single individual should 
be able to take the nation into war and thereby risk the lives of all of us, especially our young people.”).  
78 See Kenneth Schultz, Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises, 92 AM. POL. SC. 
REV. 829, 831 (1998) (pointing to empirical evidence that suggests that it will be costly for opposition 
parties to oppose wars that voters consider successful).  
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composition of Congress and legislative resistance to the use of force.79  These findings 
support the thesis in this Article that congressional resistance to the use of force is likely 
to increase if there are clear electoral payoffs for doing so.  The focus of this paper, 
however, is not on the political motivations that drive individual members of Congress, 
but the factors that affect the institutional capacity of Congress to constrain the 
President.  Thus, while this Article does not factor in the partisan composition of 
Congress in its analysis, it acknowledges that during a politically unpopular war the 
opposition members may have a greater incentive to constrain the President’s political 
agenda.  
 
 
Hypothesis 4: While the President is more likely to be shaping public opinion in his 
commander-in-chief role, Congress is more likely to be responding to public 
opinion when it constrains the President’s national security agenda. 
 
 As some scholars of the institutional presidency have noted, the President has the 
unique ability to make the first move on a policy issue and then wait for the other 
branches of government to respond.80  In the war powers context, the President’s first 
move advantage is most clearly demonstrated when he uses his role as the commander-in-
chief to create or escalate an international crisis without having to first convince the 
other institutional actors of the wisdom of his action.  While Congress and the courts may 
occasionally respond to the President’s use of force decisions, it is rare that any of these 
other branches of government actually take a proactive stance in national security 
issues. 81  
 
 Of course, when the President makes the first move on a policy decision such as 
the use of force, he is not necessarily waiting for a reaction from Congress.  It is more 
appropriate to describe the President’s first move advantage in national security issues as 
his ability to shape favorable public opinion for his preferred military course of action. 82 
Correspondingly, it is more appropriate to consider a congressional response to the 
President’s decision as a response to the public’s perception of that decision.  Thus, in 
many circumstances preceding the actual initiation of a conflict, the President will be able 
to mobilize public opinion in his favor and on those occasions Congress will usually 
rubberstamp the President’s decision.83  In other circumstances, such as when casualties 
                                                 
79 See Meernik, Congress, the President, and the Commitment of the U.S. Military, supra note __ at 
384. 
80 See HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION,  supra note __ at 14. 
81 Koh, supra note  at__ . 
82 See Robert Shapiro & Lawrence Jacobs, Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: Rethinking 
Realist Theory of Leadership, 29 PRES. STUD. Q 592 (1999) (observing the President Johnson led and directed 
public opinion on the Vietnam war).   
83 HINCKLEY, supra note __ at 80. 
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and the costs of the war become fairly significant, the public is likely to turn against the 
President and members of Congress are likely to follow suit.84 
 
The ability to frame and influence public opinion on use of force issues thus 
distinguishes presidential action from congressional intervention.  In other words, from 
the perspective of the domestic audience, the President is proactive and Congress is 
reactive on national security issues.   
 
Concluding that Congress follows public opinion on national security issues does 
not resolve the question of causality, however.  If, for instance, the President withdraws 
from a politically unpopular use of force decision, how would we know whether he is 
reacting to congressional intervention or to the negative reaction of a domestic audience? 
Or put differently, if the President is simply reacting to negative public opinion, how can 
one claim that Congress is actively constraining the President’s national security agenda? 
 
            The answer is that President has very little incentive to react directly to a negative 
domestic audience in use of force decisions.  Indeed, it will often be to the President’s 
disadvantage to withdraw or pull out of a military engagement in the midst of declining public 
support because he will look incompetent if he does so.85  In other words, instead of rewarding 
the President for withdrawing from a politically unpopular use of force, the domestic audience 
is more likely to punish him for initiating a military engagement he could not win.86  In this 
sense, the same sort of domestic audience factors that make it difficult for the President to 
back out of an escalating international crisis are also likely going to make it difficult for him 
to back out of a politically unpopular conflict.  Thus, rather than withdraw as a military 
campaign becomes unpopular, the President has an incentive to escalate the conflict and 
hope for strategic victories in the battlefield that will change the wind of public opinion.87   
 
Of course, the President’s preference may not necessarily be to entrench the 
troops in a war at all costs; he may on occasion prefer to pull out of an intractable military 
engagement if he concludes that the war is unwinnable and that he is likely to face some 
punishment by a domestic audience regardless of the eventual outcome of the military 
                                                 
84 See Timothy Cotton, War and American Democracy: Electoral Costs of the Last Five Wars,  30 J 
CONFLICT RES. 616, 619-20 (1986).  
85 See Fearon, Domestic Political Audience, supra note __ at 581 (“Backing down after making a 
show of force is often most immediately costly for a leader because it gives domestic political opponents an 
opportunity to deplore the international loss of credibility, face or honor”).   
86 See Huth & Allee, Domestic Political Accountability, supra note __ at 759 (“Opposition elites and 
mass publics . . .  do not generally hold more dovish diplomatic and military preferences than incumbent 
leaders.  Instead, they simply seek to punish leaders who adopt controversial or failed policies.”).  
87 As former Secretary of State George Ball aptly put it:  “Once we suffer large casualties, we will 
have started a well-nigh irreversible process.  Our involvement will be so great that we cannot—without 
national humiliation---stop short of achieving our goals.”  (quoted in George Downs & David Rocke, 
Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection:  The Principal Agent Problem Goes to War, 38 Am. J. Pol. Sc. 
362, 375 (1994).  Downs and Rocke characterize the practice as “gambling for resurrection.” Id. at 374-77.   
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engagement.88  Under such circumstances, the President may choose to terminate the 
military engagement but will likely try to do so in a manner that minimizes the political 
fallout from pulling out.  For instance, he may insist on settlement terms that suggest that 
the United States fulfilled some of its military objectives.   Alternatively, he may revise his 
military objectives and present the withdrawal as a victory to the domestic audience by 
arguing that some of the “revised” military objectives had been met and that further 
engagement with the foreign adversary would either be unnecessary or counterproductive.  
In all these circumstances, however, the President is likely to consider withdrawal only as 
a last resort because it is likely to result in some form of domestic audience costs. 89  Thus, 
the President’s initial preference will be to gamble that the course of the war will change 
in a favorable direction rather than admit defeat at the first signs of a negative domestic 
reaction.  
 
Unlike the President, members of Congress, especially those in the opposition, do not  
necessarily have an incentive to support the President’s use of force decision once public support for 
the war declines significantly.  On the contrary, whenever opposition members in Congress perceive 
that public opinion has turned against the war they have an incentive to mobilize immediately 
against the President’s national security agenda.   
 
These varying incentives between the President and members of Congress on the 
question of the termination of war are rooted in the asymmetric political payoffs they face 
in use of force issues.  In other words, the President faces a different political payoff than 
members of Congress when he decides to engage in a war even if the war has been 
approved by Congress. 90   When there is a rally around the flag effect, the President is 
likely to benefit from the rally effect more than members of Congress.  Correspondingly, if 
there is domestic backlash against the use of force, the President is more likely to be 
blamed than members of Congress. 91  Since the President bears a disproportionate burden 
of the costs of military failure, the opposition members of Congress might prefer to 
                                                 
88 Indeed, in certain circumstances, the President may conclude that domestic audience costs are 
likely to increase in the absence of an immediate withdrawal.  See HEIN GOEMANS, WAR AND PUNISHMENT 
39-40 (2003). 
89 Political scientists who have studied democratic regimes and war have observed that democratic 
leaders are usually reluctant to initiate international crisis unless they are assured of winning.  See Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita et al., An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace, 93 Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev. 791, 
802 (1999).  As Shapiro and Jacobs observe, Lyndon Johnson’s decision to withdraw from the presidential 
race in 1968 occurred only after he concluded that the United States’ military objectives were unattainable.  
Shapiro & Jacobs, Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: Rethinking Realist Theory of Leadership, supra 
note __ at 594.   
90 See Fitts,  The Paradox of Power, sup ra note __  at 888 (observing that the public is more likely to 
hold the President than Congress responsible for national events because of public perceptions that 
Congress faces a collective action problem).  
91 See id.  
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terminate a conflict early even if they suffer some domestic audience costs since they 
know the President is likely to suffer even higher costs. 92  
 
2.  The International Level: Sending Costly Signals to Foreign Adversaries  
 
In some circumstances, the presidential choice to seek congressional approval for 
the use of force may be a strategic signal to the foreign adversary about the United States’ 
willingness to prosecute a conflict.  Costly signals play a very important role in use of force 
situations especially when both states are mutually uncertain about each other’s cost 
tolerance for prosecuting the conflict.93  By under-taking the costly effort to seek 
authorization from Congress—an institution that includes members who have an 
incentive to oppose the President’s policy—the President sends a more credible signal of 
United States’ resolve to prosecute the conflict.94 
 
 Costly signals to a foreign adversary are especially important for democratic 
regimes.  Assume, for instance, that the foreign adversary is uncertain about the United 
States’ cost tolerance for escalating a specific conflict.   The foreign adversary may 
nonetheless conclude that because the United States is a democratic regime, there is 
likely to be an opposition party that competes with the President for political power.  
Absent the support of such an opposition, the foreign adversary may reckon that the cost 
tolerance of the United States for military casualties is likely to be low because the 
opposition stands to reap political benefits from military failure by the President.95  On the 
other hand, support by the domestic political opposition for the president’s use of force 
decision sends a credible signal to the foreign adversary because “while the government 
[in power] may have incentives to bluff (about the United States’ resolve), the opposition 
has no incentive to collude in the bluff.”96 
                                                 
92 See ELY, supra  note __at 53 (“[D]espite the Tonkin Gulf Resolution most members of Congress 
felt no compunction whatever about disclaiming responsibility for the war and blaming it entirely on the 
President.”) 
93 See Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences, supra note __ at 582 (observing that institutions that 
improve domestic accountability of political leaders increases the chance that the leaders will be able to 
send credible signals of resolve).  
94 Some commentators have noted that the President will seeks legislative ratification of treaties as 
a costly signal to foreign treaty partners of the United States’ commitment to its treaty obligations.  See, e.g., 
John Setear, The President’s Rational Choice of a Treaty’s Preratification Pathway:  Article II, Congressional-
Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement?, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 5 (2002). 
95 Indeed, leaders that face a strong domestic opposition are more credible when they issue threats 
precisely because there are domestic opponents who stand to benefit politically if the leaders backs out of an 
international crisis.   See Paul Huth & Todd Allee, Domestic Political Accountability, supra note __ at 759.  
96 Kenneth Schultz, Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises , 92 AMER. POL. SC. 
REV. 829, 838 (1998). In 1986, Caspar Weinbe rger, then Secretary of Defense wrote that legislative 
participation and public support were crucial in signaling United States resolve: 
  
Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, the U.S. government should 
have some reasonable assurance of the American people and their elected representatives in 
Congress. . . . The public elects the President as a leader, not a follower.  He takes an oath to 
protect and defend the Constitution.  The people also expect a Congress sworn to the same 
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 Sending a costly signal to the foreign adversary may only be important to the 
President when he believes that the foreign adversary has significant military capabilities 
or a high level of resolve.  In other words, the more the President believes that an 
immediate victory is likely with a non-costly show of force, the less the value of the costly 
signal.   As mentioned earlier, a President who seeks congressional authorization for the 
use of force risks the possibility of outright rejection of his national security agenda.97  
Thus, in the context of “little wars” where the prospects of immediate victory are high, 
the President is more likely to dispense with the role of congressional authorization as a 
costly signal.98  This last consideration leads up to our final hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Where the President is uncertain about the military capabilities and 
the level of resolve of a foreign adversary, he is likely to resort to congressional 
authorization to send a costly signal to the foreign adversary of United States’ 
resolve to prosecute the conflict. 
 
 The problem with the hypothesis above is that it involves a variable—the value of 
costly signaling—which is interdependent with the political insurance variable discussed 
in the first hypothesis.  Often, the presidential decision to seek domestic political 
insurance through congressional authorization will also implicate the presidential need to 
send a costly signal to the foreign adversary.  For instance, when the President seeks 
congressional approval as a form of political insurance because he is worried about the 
prospects of military failure, he may also conclude that the lack of congressional 
authorization is likely to increase the chance for military failure.  Thus, the President’s 
desire to signal resolve to the foreign enemy is likely to overlap with his desire to seek 
political insurance through congressional authorization.  
 
Because the President is likely to anticipate congressional reaction when he 
decides whether he wants to send a signal to the foreign adversary, it will often be very 
difficult to isolate the causal variables in any particular presidential decision to seek 
congressional authorization.  Although the historical evidence in some of the case studies 
suggest that both variables are at play, the issue of falsifiability looms large.  Therefore, for 
the skeptic, is may be difficult to test the theoretical framework espoused here against the 
alternatives.   Even with these limitations, however, the following case studies probably 
provide the best method for evaluating the strength of the theoretical model.  Through 
the various speeches, floor amendments, newspaper reports and executive edicts referred 
to in these case studies, we are given a window into some of the thought processes of the 
institutional actors that drive the use of force decisions.   
                                                                                                                                                 
principles and duties.  To that end, the president and leadership of the Congress must build the 
public consensus necessary to protect our vital interests.    
  
Caspar Weinberger, U.S. Defense Strategy , 65 Foreign Affairs 675, 686 (1986). 
 
97 See discussion at supra notes __ 
98 See discussion at supra notes __ 
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II.  THE CASE STUDIES OF PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL INTERACTION ON 
WAR-POWERS 
 
This Part of the Article examines 4 different modern case studies of 
presidential-executive interaction on the use of force: (1) President Reagan’s 1982-1983 
deployment of Marines in Lebanon; (2) President Reagan’s 1983 invasion of the 
Caribbean island of Grenada; (3) President Clinton’s 1993 effort to provide humanitarian 
relief after a state-breakdown in Somalia (“Operation Restore Hope”); and (4) President 
Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq.99  
 
 These case studies reveal that presidents are more likely to seek congressional 
authorization in use of force situations that require extensive troop deployments over a 
long period of time.  Such extended troop deployments are effective proxies for the 
president’s belief that the war is likely to involve a significant risk of casualties or military 
stalemate.   Moreover, Congress is more likely to intervene in two separate circumstances: 
(1) in protracted wars where there is declining public support; (2) in the shadow of a 
recent unpopular use of force.   For instance, the protracted deployment of U.S. Marines 
in Lebanon came under a lot of congressional fire after the October 1983 barracks 
bombing that killed 239 servicemen.100    
 
 Moreover, these case studies also illustrate certain consistent patterns in 
congressional and presidential reaction to negative public opinion polls of the use of force.  
For instance, in the midst of declining public support for a foreign military engagement, 
presidents are more likely to try gamble on reviving public support by mounting a public 
relations campaign or escalating the conflict with the hope of achieving politically 
strategic victories.  In such circumstances, presidents usually argue that the withdrawal of 
troops in the face of negative opinion polls is inappropriate because it will send a wrong 
signal to foreign adversaries of the United States’ resolve to protect its interests.  On the 
other hand, members of Congress seem more willing to pursue a withdrawal strategy once 
public opinion turns against the use of force.    
  
Beyond the case studies examined in detail below, presidents have shown in other 
circumstances that they are willing to commit United States Forces to military 
engagements without congressional authorization when the immediate prospects of 
victory are high.  For instance, in December 1989, while Congress was on recess, 
President Bush announced that he had ordered the invasion of Panama, citing threats to 
the significant American military and civilian presence in that country by the military 
                                                 
99 For the methodological approach I used to generate the public opinion polls and graphs in these 
case studies, I simply gathered public opinion data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research over 
the relevant periods for the wars used in the case studies.  This data is available on Roper’s website at 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/.  To determine whether opinion polls changed over time, I recalculated 
the poll responses to eliminate don’t know, not sure, and no opinion responses.  See Benjamin Page & 
ROBERT SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICANS ' POLICY PREFERENCES 
44-53 (1992) (adopting similar conventions to test change of American public opinion over time).  
100 See discussion infra notes __ 
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regime of General Manuel Noriega.101   President Bush did not even bother to consult 
formally with Congress and by the time Congress came back from the winter recess in 
January 1990 the invasion was over.102  Given the relatively rapid and decisive victory in 
Panama and the subsequent capture of General Noriega, President Bush’s invasion 
proved to be fairly popular with the domestic audience.103  In his decision to invade, 
President Bush understandably chose to dispense with congressional approval because 
Panama was too weak to be much of a political risk and the likelihood of a swift military 
victory was fairly high.  In the end, congressional response to the President’s unilateral 
action was overwhelmingly positive even though the President had effectively left 
Congress completely out of the decision-making process. 104   
 
Interestingly, there are other such instances of unilateral use of force by the 
President in low-risk conflicts in the post-Vietnam era: the 1975 rescue mission on the 
U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez, the 1980 Iran rescue mission, the 1986 air strikes against 
Libya, the 1987 escort operations in the Persian Gulf, the 1993 air strikes against Iraq for 
attempting to assassinate President Bush, the 1993 air strikes in Bosnia, the 1998 air 
strikes against terrorist sites in Sudan and Afghanistan; and the 1999 air strikes against 
Bosnia.  
 
Although the focus of these cases studies is on post-Vietnam uses of force, the 
Vietnam conflict itself is also a very good illustration how presidential interaction with 
the domestic audience can shape the division of war-powers authority.  For instance, the 
beginning of the conflict, which culminated in Congress granting the President broad 
authority under the Tonkin-Gulf Resolution, is a veritable example of how the 
presidential management of a crisis constrains Congress’s decision-making space.  In the 
tense and uncertain atmosphere following the Tonkin Gulf incidents, President Johnson 
was able to frame the issue as an act of foreign aggression that required an immediate and 
decisive military response.105 Moreover, President Johnson’s strategy of escalating the 
conflict whenever there was a sustained dip in the public opinion polls also supports the 
gamble for revival hypothesis. 106    In other words, instead of following negative public 
opinion polls when the war was going badly, President Johnson tried to change the course 
of public opinion by escalating the war with the hope of achieving strategic battlefield 
                                                 
101 See Presidents Bush’s Address of Dec. 20, 1989, reprinted in 1989 CONG. Q. 3534. 
102 See Rosenthal, U.S. Forces Gain Wide Control in Panama , NY TIMES, Dec. 21, 1989, at A1. 
103 Richard Morin, Poll Shows Rising Support for Bush, Republicans; After Panama Invasion, President's 
79 Percent Approval Rating Exceeds Reagan's Peak, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1990, at A09. 
104 Pat Towell & John Felton, Invasion, Noriega Ouster Win Support on Capitol Hill, 1989 CONG. Q. 
3532, 3532. 
105 See ELY, supra note __ at 20-21 (suggesting that the Johnson administration misled Congress in 
reporting the Tonkin Gulf incidents). 
106 As Jacobs and Shapiro demonstrate, President Johnson’s administration focused its efforts on 
shaping public opinion for the war and not following it.  See Robert Shapiro & Lawrence Jacobs, Lyndon 
Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: Rethinking Realist Theory of Leadership, 29 PRES. STUDIES Q. 592, 594 
(1999).  More interestingly, their empirical analysis reveals that during the period when public opinion polls 
supporting the withdrawal of troops actually increased, President Johnson’s “militaristic statements and 
decisions to increase bombing and troops levels also continued to increase.” Id. at 607. 
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victories.  Finally, the conflict also supports the hypothesis that Congress will act to 
constrain the President’s war-making initiative when there is a sustained loss of public 
support for the use of force.   Indeed, it was the congressional action to cut-off funds that 
eventually led to the final withdrawal of troops from Southeast Asia under Nixon’s 
presidency.107 
 
A. The 1982-1984 Intervention in Lebanon and the 1983 Intervention in    
                 Grenada 
 
In many ways, the interventions in Lebanon in 1982-1984 and the intervention  
in Grenada in 1983 are inextricably linked from the perspective of domestic audience 
costs.  The Grenada invasion was commenced two days after the most tragic moment of 
the Lebanon intervention: the October 23, 1983 terrorist bombing of the U.S. Marine 
barracks in Beirut that left over 269 Marines dead and dozens injured.108  The eventual 
success of the Grenada invasion managed to divert public attention from the tragedy 
unfolding in Beirut.  More importantly, the significant public support for the relatively 
rapid Grenada invasion most likely muted growing public distaste for the American 
military role in Lebanon.  When the euphoria of the Grenada invasion wore off, however, 
public dissatisfaction with the Lebanese intervention increased and Congress continued 
to mount resistance to the President’s Middle-East policies.  As discussed in more detail 
below, such congressional resistance proved to be crucial in the President’s decision to 
order the withdrawal of the Marines from Lebanon in March 31, 1984.  In any event, 
given the complex relationship between the public reactions to the Grenada and Lebanon 
interventions, it is hard to analyze these two conflicts in isolation from one another.  
Thus, the following two case studies will often discuss both conflicts when necessary to 
understand the context of the domestic audience’s reactions to these conflicts. 
 
        1. Lebanon.  In 1982 Lebanon was a country wracked by civil war with  
over six warring factions occupying different parts of the country.  The United States 
intervention in that country in 1982 would consist of two separate deployments.   The 
first deployment, which lasted less than a month, occurred in August 1982 and involved 
overseeing the withdrawal of PLO forces from Lebanon.109  The second deployment, 
which occurred in late September that year, involved a multinational effort to restore 
order after Christian Phalangist militiamen massacred 460 people in two Palestinian 
refugee camps ostensibly in retaliation for the assassination of Lebanese President Amin 
Gemayal.110  Initially, President Reagan did not seek congressional authorization for either 
                                                 
107See Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1974, Pub.L.No.93-52, 93rd Cong. 2nd Sess. 
(July 1, 1973), § 108 (providing that “on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore 
appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United 
States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or 
Cambodia.”); see also   MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 289 (1990) (describing how 
public opinion led Congress to cut off funds for the Vietnam conflict). 
108 Steven Strasser, The Marine Massacre, NEWSWEEK, 31 Oct. 1983. 
109 Richard Whittle, Report on Marines Skirts War Powers Issues, 1982 Cong. Q. 2157, 2158 
110 Richard Whittle, Congress Uncertain about Aid to Isreal , 1982 Cong. Q. 2357, 2357/ 
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of these deployments. 111  In both instances, the number of troops initially deployed was 
relatively small—less than 1,200 troops and the administration insisted the troops would 
be out by the end of the year.  By late that year, however, the situation in Lebanon had 
worsened and the Christian-led government of Amin Gemayal had asked the countries 
contributing to the multinational force to increase their presence.112  When President 
Reagan announced in December 1982 that he would seriously consider the Lebanese 
government’s request to double the Marine presence in Lebanon, some members of 
Congress started requesting formal reassurances from the administration regarding the 
scope of the U.S. military role in Lebanon.113 
  
Although there were occasional congressional requests to President Reagan 
regarding the role of the Marines in Lebanon, Congress did not play any formal role in the 
Lebanese intervention until mid-year 1983.  The congressional intervention was triggered 
in part by a bomb that exploded at the U.S. embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983 that 
killed 61 people.114  The day after the bombing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
passed a bill that approved $250 million for military and economic aid to Lebanon but the 
bill was contingent on the President seeking congressional approval for any expansion of 
the U.S. military role in Lebanon.115  Eventually, President Reagan signed the resulting 
legislation--the Lebanese Emergency Assistance Act of 1983 (the “LEAA”).116   Although 
the LEAA explicitly required that the President seek congressional authority for any 
future expansion of the mission in Lebanese, it did not in any way suggest that the WPR 
was triggered by the events in Lebanon or that the duration of the deployment was 
contingent on congressional authorization. 
 
 By late August, events in Lebanon started to look bleak.  On August 29, Druse 
militia forces attacked a contingent of U.S. military forces in West Beirut and killed two 
Marines. 117  The President reported these casualties to certain congressional leaders but 
disclaimed that the Marines were facing any imminent hostilities within the meaning of 
section 4(a)(1) of the WPR.118   The President also quickly escalated the conflict and 
ordered the additional deployment of 2,000 Marines in ships off the coast of Lebanon.119  
By September, Marines and naval units were actively shelling Muslim militia positions in 
villages near Beirut.  At this stage, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the 
                                                 
111 John Felton, Some in Congress Uneasy About New Role for Marines in Lebanon Peace Force, 1982 
Cong. Q. 2469 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 2469.  
114 DANIEL P. BOLGER, SAVAGE PEACE 172 (1995). 
115 The Lebanon Aid Bill--H.R. 2532 in its House incarnation and S. 639 in the Senate--had been 
introduced in the Senate on March 1, 1983 and in the House on April 13. See 129 Cong. Rec. 3295 & 8452 
(1983). 
116 See 129 Cong. Rec. 14,349-50 (1983) 
117 Steven R. Weisman, From Santa Barbara, Shock, Grief and Blame , N.Y. Times, August 30, 1983 
at A9.  
118 BOLGER, supra  note __, at 179.  
119 William E. Farrel, U.S. Positioning 2000 Marines Off Beirut Coast , NY TIMES, September 2, 1983 
at A1.   
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administration to deny that the U.S. forces were not engaged in hostilities in Lebanon.  
Moreover, more members of Congress were becoming more assertive about their concerns 
in the ongoing crisis.120  Congressional leaders, including Senator Robert Byrd of West 
Virginia, were insisting that the WPR was operative and that the sixty-day time clock 
under section 4(a)(1) was triggered once the Marines were killed in action on August 29, 
1983.121  The President was also somewhat vulnerable from a political standpoint because 
the first national political poll on the deployment in almost a year suggested that only 40 
% of Americans were satisfied with how the President was handling the Lebanese 
intervention.122 
 
 In this delicate political environment, the Congress and the President began to 
negotiate the proper contours of a congressional role in the Lebanese intervention.  The 
President warned that any signs of congressional opposition to the deployment were likely 
to send the wrong signal to the foreign adversary and terrorists. 123  The President and 
Congress eventually reached a compromise position with legislation that expressly 
declared that hostilities in Lebanon started on August 29, 1983, but then authorized the 
deployment of the Marines for an additional eighteen months from the date of 
enactment.124  This new legislation—the Multinational Force in Lebanon 
Resolution(MFLR)—expressly disclaimed any intention to supersede the WPR even 
though it effectively rescinded the sixty-day triggering mechanism under section 4(a)(1) 
of the WPR.  Certain provisions were consistent with the spirit of the WPR: section 7 
gave Congress the authority to terminate the conflict at any time before the 18 month 
time limit by passing a joint Resolution; and section 4 required that the President seek 
congressional approval before expanding the mission of the Marine deployment.125  In 
signing the legislation, President Reagan praised the cooperative spirit of Congress but 
also expressly made it clear that he believed that his constitutional authority as the 
commander-in-chief was in no way constrained by the provisions of the WPR. 126 
 
The political cooperation that gave birth to the MFLR was short-lived.  On 
October 23, 1983, a bomb exploded outside the Marine barracks in Beirut and killed 269 
Marines. 127  The mainstream media quickly attacked the President’s Middle-East policies 
and suggested that the public was growing frustrated with the role of U.S. forces in 
                                                 
120 Id.  
121 Hedrick Smith, Reagan Upgrading Lebanon Presence, NY TIMES, September. 13, 1983 at A1.  
122 See opinion polls data in Table 2 infra . 
123 See Steven R. Weisman, White House Warns A War Powers Fight Hurts U.S. Interests, NY TIMES, 
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124 Felton, Domestic Debate Follows Lebanese Violence, 1983 Cong.  Q. 1912, 1912. 
125 See 129 Cong. Rec. 25,747 (1983) (text of S.J. Res. 159). 
126 Ronald Reagan, statement upon signing PL 98-119 (Oct. 12, 1983), reprinted in 1983 Cong. Q. 
2142, 2142. 
127 See Strasser, supra  note __ at 1. 
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Lebanon.128  Various members of Congress reacted predictably with outrage.  Barely two 
days after the bombing several congressional democrats threatened to break ranks with 
the party leadership and craft a proposal that would cut off all funding for the Marines in 
Lebanon and force the President to withdraw the troops. 129  Even members of Congress 
who supported the President acknowledged that the mood of Congress had changed 
significantly and that a reevaluation of the Marine deployment would be necessary.130  
 
On October 26, barely three days after the bombing in Beirut, the President 
ordered the invasion of the Caribbean island-nation of Grenada.131  The reasons given for 
the invasion were to quell the growing communist threat posed by political instability on 
that island and to rescue American citizens living on the island who were endangered by 
the ensuing political turmoil.132  The invasion ostensibly diverted the attention of the 
public and Congress from the events in Lebanon.  In the midst of these two ongoing 
crises, President Reagan went on national television to defend his actions. 
 
President Reagan’s television address to the nation on October 27, 1983 was a 
classic example of an attempt by the President to create a “rally round the flag” effect in 
the midst of an international crisis.  First, President Reagan announced that the 
objectives of both the Grenada and Lebanon invasions were similar and couched them in 
terms of defending American interests from a growing double threat of Soviet and Cuban 
communism.133  In Lebanon, the growing communist threat stemmed ostensibly from the 
alignment of Syrian and Soviet interests.  President Reagan insisted that only the United 
States and the other members of the multinational force could prevent the Syrians from 
toppling the government of President Amin Gemayal.134  In effect, the President framed 
the objectives of both engagements as an effort to protect the nation from a foreign 
threat—an objective that would be more amenable to the “rally around the flag effect” 
than intervention in the internal political affairs of another country.135  Second, the 
President tried to reassure the country that the enemy was dangerous and had committed 
provocative acts that required decisive action.  In the Grenada context, for instance, 
President Reagan explained that that the only remnant of governmental authority 
involved the imposition of “a 24 hour curfew with orders to shoot on sight anyone found 
moving in those 24 hours.”136 He concluded that American citizens were under great 
danger and were seeking to escape from the political chaos. 137   
                                                 
128 Robert McFadden, Americans React to Attack with Frustration and Doubt, NY TIMES, 24 October 
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In the end, both the impact of the Grenada invasion and President Reagan’s 
October 27 speech proved to be very effective at shaping public perception of the U.S. 
military role in Lebanon—at least in the short term.  A CBS/New York Times poll taken 
after the speech showed that 57.3 percent of Americans approved of the American 
government sending Marines to Lebanon—up from 40% from a similar poll in September 
and up from 53.8% from a poll the night before the speech.138  Among those who actually 
heard the President’s speech, however, the change was even more dramatic – 66.8 
percent actually approved of the Marine presence in Lebanon.139  In sum, the President’s 
speech on the Lebanese crisis in the wake of the Grenada invasion was an apt 
demonstration of an executive branch effort to gamble on the resurrection of public 
support in the midst of a significant foreign policy setback (the Beirut barracks tragedy).      
 
The public euphoria surrounding the Grenada invasion fizzled out by late 
November, however.  By December 1983, the public mood towards the deployment in 
Lebanon had changed significantly and so had the stance of major congressional leaders. 
Earlier that month, 8 American servicemen were killed in a raid against Syrian 
antiaircraft positions in East Beirut.140  In a Gallup poll in mid-December, about 52 
percent of the respondents said they thought it was a mistake for the United States to 
send the Marines to Lebanon.141   Democratic members of Congress in the House and 
Senate were busy introducing a variety of bills that would ostensibly cut-off funding for 
the Marine deployment in Lebanon.142  But it was not only Democratic members of 
Congress who were growing increasingly skeptical of the Lebanon deployment.  By late 
December, Congressman Robert Michel, the House Minority Leader, was urging 
President Reagan to pull out the Marines in Lebanon as soon as possible.143  Earlier, 
Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland, another prominent Republican legislator, 
announced that he would support a Resolution that would reduce the 18 month 
withdrawal timeframe under the MFLR to 6 months. 144   
 
In the face of mounting public criticism of the Lebanese deployment and 
legislative threats to force a withdrawal of the troops, President Reagan mounted a public 
relations counter-offensive.   In his weekly radio address on December 10, 1983 President 
Reagan vowed in the face of growing casualties that American troops would remain in 
Lebanon until “internal stability is established.”145  Later on at a news conference in 
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December 14,  President Reagan announced that the United States would not withdraw 
its troops until the government of Lebanon had control of its territory or until the 
complete collapse of order in that country.146  But the heat for pulling out was on and by 
late December, Walter Mondale—the Democratic frontrunner for the 1984 presidential 
election argued that the Marines should be pulled out of Lebanon immediately.147   A 
further blow to the President came later that month: on December 28, 1983 a 
Department of Defense committee chaired by retired Admiral Robert Long released a 
devastating report that criticized the Marine presence in Lebanon and suggested that the 
Marine barracks tragedy was a result of failures in the chain of command.148  
 
Notwithstanding the critical tone of the Long Report, the Reagan administration 
continued to campaign actively for legislative and public support for a sustained Marine 
presence in Lebanon.149  But given the growing decline in public opinion polls in support 
of the deployment,150 the President’s public relations campaign was clearly faltering.  For 
instance, a Gallup poll of January 13-16, 1984 showed that about 70% disapproved of the 
way the President was handling the situation in Lebanon.151 In early January, both 
Democratic and Republican leaders in the House issued a statement saying that a 
reassessment of the U.S. policy in Lebanon was necessary.152  The Senate and House 
Democratic Caucus eventually endorsed a proposed bill that called for the immediate 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Lebanon.153  
 
 Initially, the President was adamant and strongly opposed the proposed 
Democratic Resolution on the grounds that the Resolution would clearly make matters 
worse for the troops in Lebanon.154  In addition, the President seemed to react to the news 
by escalating the conflict and increasing the strikes on enemy positions in Lebanon.155 
Indeed, as the situation in Lebanon got worse, President Reagan’s level of resolve seemed 
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to increase.156  But by early February, however, the President caved into congressional 
pressure and started drafting plans for the withdrawal of troops. 157  By February 21, the 
Marines were deployed to ships offshore and by March 30, 1984 the United Stated 
formally ended its participation in the multinational forces deployed in Lebanon.158 
 
In announcing the withdrawal of U.S. troops, President Reagan insisted that the 
United States was not abandoning its mission in Lebanon but had instead decided to 
change tactics. 159   Less than 2 weeks after President Reagan ordered the withdrawal of 
the troops and thanked Congress for its role, he went on the attack and blamed the 
congressional leadership for the failures in Lebanon.  The President claimed that although 
Congress had approved an 18 month deployment under the MFLR, “the subsequent 
second-guessing about whether to keep our men there severely undermined our policy.”160  
Various members of Congress countered this attack and argued that the failure of the 
Lebanese deployment was exclusively the President’s fault.161 
 
The President’s effort to place blame on Congress for the Lebanese debacle is 
consistent with what the theoretical model would predict.  Since Congress played such an 
active role by approving the Lebanon deployment and by pressuring the President to 
withdraw, the President wanted to make sure that Congress got its fair share of the blame 
for the failure of the deployment.162  On the other hand, members of Congress, 
particularly those in opposition, were poised to exploit the President’s misfortunes in 
Lebanon.  Indeed, many of the Democratic Presidential candidates tried to make the 
Lebanese deployment a key issue in the election.  The Democratic Speaker of the House, 
who had been initially very supportive of the deployment called the President’s Lebanese 
                                                 
156 See Leslie Gelb, The  U.S. Commitment Continues to Deepen , NY TIMES, February 7, 1984, at A 
16.  
 
157In this speech, the President announced that he “had asked Secretary of Defense Weinberger to 
present to me a plan for redeployment of the Marines from Beirut airport to their ships offshore.”  See Text 
of President’s Statement on Redeployment of Marines , NY TIMES, Feb. 8, 1984, at A16. 
158 See Text of President’s Letter on Multinational Force, NY TIMES, March 31, 1984 at 3;  U.S. 
Withdrawing Its Military Force on Lebanon Coast, NY TIMES, March 31, 1984 at A1; Irvin Molotsky, 
Lawmakers Welcome Pullout from Lebanon, NY TIMES, April 1, 1984, Section 1 at 12. 
159 The President also made it clear that he was not ordering the Marines to “cut and run” in 
Lebanon, but was merely   “redeploying the troops.”  Francis Clines, White House Denies it Cuts and Runs, 
NY TIMES, February 9, 1984, at A12. 
160 Excerpts from President Reagan’s Speech on Foreign Policy and Congress, NY TIMES, April 7, 1984 
at 6; see also  Francis Climes, Reagan Attacks Congress’s Role on Many Fronts, NY TIMES, April 4, 1984 at A1; 
see also Shutlz Says Pullout Harmed U.S., NY TIMES, April 2, 1984 at A3. 
161 See Martin Tolchin, O’Neill Asserts Deaths in Beirut ‘Lie on’ Reagan, NY TIMES, April 5, 1984 at 
A12.  
162The administration subsequently acknowledged that seeking congressional approval of the 
deployment served a strategic purpose for the White House: it would mean that Congress would get to 
share the blame for any potential failure in the Lebanese intervention.  For instance, Deputy Secretary of 
State Eagleburger later stated that Congress has a share of responsibility because f its enactment of 
Multinational force in Lebanon Resolution.  See Felton, Democrats Step up Pressure for Beirut Pullout , 1984 
Cong. Q. 227, 227-28 
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policy “‘the biggest blunder, the biggest mistake’ he had made in the White House.”163 
Predictably, members of Congress who initially supported the Resolution authorizing the 
deployment claimed they were deceived because the President misrepresented the 
prospects for peace in the region.164 
 
The varying reactions of the President and Congress to public opinion surveys on 
the Lebanese deployment were also very informative.  As public opinion polls turned 
against the Lebanese deployment, congressional leaders (especially those on the 
opposition) turned up the heat and urged immediate withdrawal from Lebanon.  
Interestingly, however, when public opinion polls in the aftermath of President Reagan’s 
appeal to the nation on October 27, 1983 showed that a slight majority of Americans 
favored a sustained Lebanese deployment, leading members of Congress changed their 
tone during that period and resigned themselves to a long term U.S. troop deployment.165 
 
TABLE 2 
Public Opinion Polls on the United States Intervention in Lebanon, 1982-1984 (in 
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163 Martin Tolchin, O’Neill Asserts Deaths in Beirut ‘Lie on’ Reagan , NY TIMES, April 5, 1984 at 
A12.  
164 Id.  
165 Steven Roberts, Pullout in Beirut Rejected in House, NY TIMES, Nov. 3, 1983, at A15.  
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The President’s response to the public opinion polls was remarkably different.    
Rather than capitulate and withdraw the Marines when public opinion polls turned 
against the deployment in December 1983 and January 1984, the President repeatedly 
went on a public relations offensive and attempted to explain why withdrawal would be a 
victory for terrorists and Syrian (and by extension Soviet) interests in the Middle East.166  
At various points in early 1984, President Reagan suggested that the enemy in the Middle 
East was being emboldened by Congress’s lack of resolve on Lebanon and that a firm 
policy to stay the course would defeat the Syrians’ determination.167  The White House 
also tried to influence public opinion by emphasizing some of the military successes in that 
region.  Indeed, the White House’s positive spin on the deployment was so pervasive that 
Speaker of the House O’Neill reportedly accused the President of turning a blind eye to 
reality: “Every time I talk to you, you say things are going well, but there’s nothing but 
deterioration going on over there.” 168   In sum, rather than concede to public opinion 
polls and admit that the Lebanon deployment was a failure, President Reagan actually 
tried to resurrect public support by arguing that the situation in Lebanon was better than 
how the media portrayed it and that steadfastness would bring about victory in the end.  
Predictably, President Reagan also escalated the crisis by bombing selective enemy targets 
even as congressional and public support was declining rapidly.  
 
Finally, Congress’s response in the Lebanese crisis is consistent with what the 
model would predict.  After two consecutive months of declining public approval of the 
war, Congress moved decisively to constrain the President’s Lebanon military agenda.169 
In asserting its war powers role, Congress wielded the statutory tools that it had at its 
disposal, such as the WPR and the MFLR, to force the President to withdraw the 
troops. 170  Had the President not agreed to a withdrawal in the early months of 1984, a 
congressional resolution under the WPR that would have forced such a withdrawal 
seemed all but inevitable.   In the end, President Reagan made it clear that in ordering 
the withdrawal from Lebanon he was not following his preferred military strategy but one 
foisted upon him by congressional leaders.  Moreover, the White House’s harsh public 
attack on the WPR and Congress’s role in the withdrawal from Lebanon is testament to 
the President’s belief that his national security options were constrained.  In sum, 
Congress’s effective use of the WPR in the Lebanon deployment is largely inconsistent 
                                                 
166 See Hedrick Smith, Reagan Plan: Share Blame , NY TIMES, January 26, 1984 at B7 (“With public 
opinion survey showing a majority of American public favoring withdrawal . . ., Mr. Reagan tonight stressed 
an emerging Administration justification for keeping them there. ‘We must not be driven from our 
objectives for peace in Lebanon by state-sponsored terrorism.’”).  
167 Excerpts from U.S. Aide’s Statement on Reagan’s View of Marine Pullout , NY TIMES, February 3, 
1984 (“Syrian officials commented that the United States seemed ‘short of breadth.’  In short, when we 
showed steadiness of purpose, progress was being made.  When we wavered, progress stopped.  When we 
show that steadiness again, progress will resume.”).   
168 Steven Weisman, Aides Say President Started Pullback Process Weeks Ago, NY TIMES, February 9, 
1984 at A 12.  
169 See CQ Congress Collection, Foreign Policy, 1981-1984 Legislative Overview 
170 See Id.  
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with the conventional wisdom that the WPR is a useless statutory device that has only 
symbolic value.  
 
2.    Grenada.  On 25 October 1983, President Reagan  
announced that forces from the United States and some other Caribbean nations had 
begun landing on the Caribbean Island of Grenada.171   President Reagan announced he 
had ordered this intervention for three reasons: to protect American citizens—many of 
them students at St George’s School of Medicine; to prevent further breakdown in the 
political situation on the Island; and to restore law and order.172  The intervention 
occurred approximately 2 weeks after a coup deposed the leftist regime of Prime Minister 
Maurice Bishop.173  Subsequently, the coup plotters executed Bishop and declared a dusk 
to dawn curfew with instructions to shoot on sight any violators.  174 
 
The Grenadian military intervention occurred in the shadow of the bombing of 
the Marine Barracks in Lebanon; indeed, it occurred just 2 days after the Beirut tragedy.   
In many ways the events unfolding in Lebanon played a very key role in the military 
intervention in Grenada.  First, the 1,900 troops that were diverted to conduct the 
invasion of Grenada were actually bound for off-shore duty in Lebanon. 175  Second, the 
administration explicitly acknowledged that the decision to invade Grenada was in part 
prompted by the Barracks bombing in Lebanon because President Reagan was concerned 
that Grenada could become “another Beirut.” 176 Third, the shadow of the Barracks 
bombing framed the political landscape against which Congress reacted to the Grenada 
invasion.   
 
Like the initial deployments in Lebanon, Congress seemed to be left in the dark 
on the decision to invade Grenada.  In other words, the President did not formally consult 
with Congress before the invasion as required under section 3 of the WPR.  The President 
did invite a bipartisan group of congressional leaders to the White House on Monday, 24 
October 1983, but he apparently only confided in them details about a decision to invade 
he had already made three hours ago.177   The President did deliver a report, however, on 
the afternoon of October 27, which he mentioned that he was filing pursuant to his 
authority of the commander-in-chief of the United States armed forces and consistent 
with the WPR.178  The House moved quickly to invoke the triggering requirements of 
section 4(a)(1) of the WPR by passing the relevant legislation and the house version of 
                                                 
171 President’s Remarks, 25 October 1983, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 83 (Dec. 1983), p. 
67. 
172 Gary Williams, Prelude to an Intervention: Grenada, 29 J. Lat. Amer. Stud., 131-169 (1983).   
173 Id. at 133.   
174 Id.  
175 Id. 
176 See Bernard Gwertzman, An Invasion Prompted by Previous Debacles, NY TIMES, October 26, 
1983, at A1.  
177See  President Reagan’s Letter to Senator Thurmond, (October 25, 1983), in 129 Cong. Rec. 
29,832 (1983); see also Hedrick Smith, 1,900 U.S. Troops, with Caribbean Allies, Invade Grenada and Fight, 
NY TIMES, October 25, 1983, at A1. 
178 See 129 Cong. Rec. 29,997 (1983). 
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the bill—H.J. Res. 402—passed on November 2, 1983.179  The Senate version of the bill 
was introduced as an amendment to a bill increasing the national debt ceiling, which was 
ultimately defeated on October 31, 1984.180  Congress eventually adjourned without ever 
successfully passing a two-chamber bill that formally invoked the WPR in the Grenadian 
invasion.181  In any event, the invasion was over in about a week and any further 
congressional action would have proven irrelevant by that time.  
 
Although the President did not seek a congressional role in the Grenada invasion, 
leading members of Congress were not indifferent about the invasion.  Since it occurred 
in the shadow of the Beirut Barracks bombing—an unpopular use of force incident, many 
members of Congress, especially those in the opposition, had an incentive to oppose the 
President’s move and they did so.   For instance, Senator Patrick Moynihan condemned 
the invasion as “an act of war” and added: “I don’t know that you restore democracy at 
the point of a bayonet.”182 Aside from leading members of the opposition, significant 
Republican members also expressed misgivings about the invasion.  Republican 
Representative Olympia Snowe, who served on the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
summarized the odd political posture of the invasion: “I’m dismayed we’re involved in 
Grenada, especially on the heels of Beirut  . . . The two events raise a lot of concerns 
about exactly what we’re doing.”183   Senator Weiker, a Republican from Connecticut, 
also accused Reagan of “flouting the law” by invading Grenada.184  Although House 
Speaker O’Neill was initially supportive of the invasion, he subsequently turned against 
the President and described the invasion as “gunboat diplomacy” with “frightening” policy 
implications.185  Other members of Congress, from both sides of the aisle, also complained 
that the invasion was illegal because President did not comply with the consulting 
requirements of the WPR .186  In addition to skeptical members of Congress, most of the 
                                                 
179 See 1983 Cong. Q. 2326.  
180 See 129 Cong. Rec. 29,835 (1983) 
181 Id.; see also Hedrick Smith, O’Neill Now Calls Grenada Invasion ‘Justified’ Action, NY TIMES, 
Nov. 9, 1983, at A1. 
182 See Steven Roberts, Capitol is Sharply Divided Over the Wisdom on Invading Grenada , NY TIMES, 
October 25, 1983 at A22.  Senator Cranston of California desc ribed Reagan as a “trigger happy president . . 
. who has recklessly landed the United States in two civil wars.” Steven Roberts, Democrats Move on War 
Powers Act, NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A 18.  Senator Eagleton of Missouri attacked the purported 
objectives of the invasion: “The notion that American nationals were endangered is flimsy, illusory, and 
hypothetical.” Steven Roberts, Democrats Move on War Powers Act , NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A 18. 
183 See Responses are Wide-Ranging , NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A21. 
184 See Steve Roberts, O’Neill Criticizes President; War Powers is Invoked, NY TIMES, October 29, 
1983, at 4. 
185 Id. at 4.  
186 Congressman Torricelli lamented that “[The WPR] does not say in all cases except Grenada.  It 
does not say in all cases except when the Cubans are involved.  It says the President shall consult with the 
Congress in all cases.”  U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Grenada War Powers, Markup 
on H. J. Res. 402, October 27, 1983, 98th Cong., 1st Sess, 1983, 12; see also   Steven Roberts, Capitol is 
Sharply Divided Over the Wisdom on Invading Grenada , NY TIMES, October 25, 1983 at A22; see also  Steven 
Roberts, Democrats Move on War Powers Act , NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A 18 
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United State’s traditional allies—including Great Britain, Italy and France—also strongly 
condemned the invasion.187 
 
Given the recent experience in Lebanon and the President’s political 
vulnerability, the congressional critics of the President’s Grenada policy probably believed 
that the invasion would prove to be a political miscalculation.188  In any event, they did 
not obviously expect the overwhelming military success of the invasion and the resulting 
wave of patriotic euphoria that followed.189  As medical students arriving from St. George 
expressed gratitude and praise to the President for rescuing them,190 opinion polls in favor 
of the invasion soared.191  Invariably, the positive public opinion polls of the invasion were 
due in part to the President’s well-managed public relations campaign.  As the polls 
picked up, most of the President’s critics retreated.  By early November—which was a 
critical time in the opinion polls—the invasion was over and mainstream media had 
largely described it as a success. 192  In an astonishing concession, Senator Moynihan 
retreated from his previous critical stance of less than two weeks ago and declared: “The 
move is popular and therefore there’s no disposition in the Senate to be opposed to it.”193  
Speaker of the House O’Neil also did an about-face and subsequently announced that the 
invasion was “justified” because American citizens on the island were in jeopardy.194  As 
demonstrated in the graph below, the change in the congressional response to the 
invasion in early November seemed to mirror the increase in public opinion polls in favor 
of the invasion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
187 See Bernard Gwertzman, Allies Criticism of U.S. Raises Wider Questions , NY TIMES, October 27, 
1983 at A21. 
188 See Steven Roberts, Democrats Move on War Powers Act , NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A 18 
(observing that with Grenada invasion there was “a growing belief among Democrats that they might be 
able to paint President Reagan as ‘trigger happy’ President in next year’s election campaign.”). 
189 Draymond Ayres, U.S. Says Grenada Invasion is Succeeding; 600 Cubans Seized After Heavy 
Resistance , NY TIMES, Oct. 27, 1983, at A1. 
190 Robert McFadden, From Rescued Students, Gratitude and Praise, NY TIMES, October  28, 1983 at 
A1; First Evacuees Arrive in U.S. From Grenada, NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A1.  
191 See CBS News/NY TIMES Poll, Nov. 18-20, 1983 in Table 3 infra . 
192 See Robert McFadden, From Rescued Students, Gratitude and Praise, NY TIMES, October  28, 
1983 at A1; First Evacuees Arrive in U.S. From Grenada, NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A1;  Bernard 
Gwertzman, Reagan Gains by Grenada, But Mostly on His Own Turf , Ny Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at 41. 
193 See Hendrick Smith, Capitol Hill Outcry Softens as Public’s Support Swells, NY TIMES, November 
4, 1983, at A18. 
194 See Hedrick Smith, O’Neill Now Calls Grenada Invasion ‘Justified’ Action, NY TIMES, November 
9, 1983, at A1.  The invasion even won some adherents among European politicians who only a week ago 
seemed uniformly critical about the invasion.  John Vinocurs, Invasion of Grenada Wins Some Allied 
Supporters, NY TIMES, November 3, 1983, at A 23. 
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TABLE 3 
Public Opinion Polls on the United States Invasion of Grenada, 1983 (in percentages) 
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Questions:   (1)  CBS / NY Times:  Do you approve or disapprove of sending the troops to Grenada?  (10/26/1983;  10/27/1983;  11/18/1983 - 11/20/1983)  (2)  Gallup Poll:  Do you 
approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling Grenada?  (11/18/1983 - 11/21/1983)  (3) Time Magazine:  In general, do you feel that military activities of the US such as 
those in Grenada and Central America are in the best interests of the nation or not?  (12/06/1983 - 12/08/1983)   
Note:  Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.                  
 
  
On November 3, 1983, President Reagan, obviously basking in the glory of the 
successful invasion, announced that the objectives of the Grenada mission had been 
accomplished and that the troops would be home soon.195  In that same speech, he 
claimed that the military intervention was not an invasion after all—even though he had 
described as an invasion a week before—but a rescue mission.196  The White House’s 
focus on the rescue rationale of the Grenada invasion at the expense of other reasons that 
were put forth for the invasion was a strategic public relations success.  The rescue 
mission rationale resonated really well with the American public and members of 
Congress.  In the end, when the military personnel involved in the Grenada invasion 
returned back to the United States in mid-November they were greeted with a heroes’ 
welcome.   As illustrated in the graph below, the success of the Grenada invasion also 
seemed to increase the overall public perception of the President’s ability to handle 
foreign policy.  More specifically, the public approval of the President’s ability to handle 
foreign policy increased during the months of October and November 1983.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
195 See Transcript of the President’s News Conference on Rumsfeld and Grenada, NY TIMES, Nov. 4, 
1983, at A16.  
196 Francis Clines, It was a Rescue Mission, Reagan Says, NY TIMES, Nov. 4, 1983, at A16. 
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TABLE 4 
Public Opinion Polls on President Reagan’s Handling of Foreign Policy, 1983-1984 (in 
percentages) 
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CBS News and NY Times The Gallup Poll Time Magazine
Questions:   (1)  CBS / NY Times:  Do you approve or disapprove of sending the troops to Grenada?  (10/26/1983;  10/27/1983;  11/18/1983 - 11/20/1983)  (2)  Gallup Poll:  Do you 
approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling Grenada?  (11/18/1983 - 11/21/1983)  (3) Time Magazine:  In general, do you feel that military activities of the US such as 
those in Grenada and Central America are in the best interests of the nation or not?  (12/06/1983 - 12/08/1983)   
Note:  Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.                  
 
 
The Grenada invasion exhibited all the classic hallmarks of a successful military 
engagement: it was fairly rapid, it ostensibly involved the protection of American lives, 
and there were very few casualties.  The political risks to the President for not initially 
seeking congressional approval for the invasion were also very low.  Given that Grenada 
was a weak and small Caribbean island with an almost non-existent military force, the 
chances of military failure or stalemate were negligible.  Therefore, the President had very 
little need for the political insurance that prior congressional approval provides.  On the 
other hand, there were significant risks that seeking a congressional role would imperil 
the President’s chances for a quick and decisive military victory.  Given that the President 
was operating in the shadow of a relatively unpopular military undertaking in Lebanon 
which had recently taken a decisive turn for the worse, he was politically vulnerable.  
Indeed, the Grenada invasion actually took place in the immediate wake of the Marine 
barracks bombing in Beirut and at the time many members of Congress were actively 
clamoring for an immediate withdrawal from Lebanon.  In that political climate, it is 
unlikely that President Reagan would have had the opportunity to secure the quick 
congressional approval that would be necessary for a rapid and decisive military victory in 
Grenada. 
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In the context of political branch reaction to public opinion polls, the Grenada 
invasion also illustrated patterns that were consistent with what the theoretical model 
developed in this Article would predict.  In the immediate shadow of the unpopular 
Beirut barracks bombing and the Grenada invasion, various members of Congress were 
very critical of the Reagan administration and sought to invoke the provisions of the 
WPR immediately.  Once the invasion succeeded and the spectacle of obviously happy 
and grateful rescued medical students returning home filled the television screens, many 
of the same members of Congress who were initially critical of the invasion changed their 
tune and embraced the President’s agenda.  In all, members of Congress were simply 
reacting to public opinion polls and some of them, including Senator Moynihan of New 
York, were honest enough to admit it.   Also, the reaction of these members of Congress 
made it clear that they considered congressional deliberation over the merits of the 
invasion or its legality unnecessary provided that a majority of the public had already 
shown its support for the President’s decision to use force. 
 
B.  The 1992-1993 intervention in Somalia 
 
Like Lebanon in 1982, Somalia in 1992 was a country that was deeply  
entrenched in a long and seemingly interminable civil war.  In January of that year the 
military regime of Siad Barre collapsed and the country descended into a chaotic civil war 
fuelled by the battle for territory by rival clans and warlords.  A famine ensued and by late 
1992 amidst horrifying television images of widespread suffering and starvation, President 
Bush decided to intervene as part of  a UN humanitarian mission (“UNOSOM I”).197  In 
December 1992 President Bush sent about 28,000 U.S. troops to the region to aid in the 
distribution of food and relief supplies. 198  President Bush dubbed this relief operation 
“Operation Restore Hope” and it was one of the last major policy decisions he made 
before leaving office in early 1993.199 
 
 President Bush did not seek congressional approval for the December 1992 
deployment even though the deployment involved a significant number of troops. Public 
opinion polls at the time reveal, however, that support for the intervention was 
overwhelmingly high with upwards of 70% of those polled supporting the operation.200  In 
this political climate, Congress was understandably deferential to the President and there 
was no visible congressional opposition to the deployment.  Admittedly, President Bush 
also reassured certain congressional leaders that there was no risk of imminent hostilities 
and that the troops were in Somalia for purely humanitarian purposes. 201  
 
 In early 1993 President Clinton took office and decided to continue the 
deployment.  On February 4, the United States Senate passed a Resolution in support of 
                                                 
197 Michael Wines, Mission to Somalia; Bush Declares Goal in Somalia to 'Save Thousands ,' NY TIMES,  
Dec. 4, 1992, at Section 1. 
198 Senate Gives Belated Blessing to Somalia Intervention, 1993 Cong. Q. 277, 277. 
199 See id; Bush Sends U.S. Troops to Somalia, 1992 Cong. Q. 535, 535.    
200 See ABC  News Poll, Dec. 11-14, 1992 in Table 5 infra . 
201 See Carroll J. Doherty, The Reluctant Warriors , 1993 Cong. Q. 323, 323. 
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Operation Restore Hope—S.J. Res. 45—and declared that the Resolution was consistent 
with the WPR. 202  The Resolution also requested the transfer of the humanitarian 
mission to the UN at the earliest possible date.203  The House passed its own version of 
the Resolution on May 25 and the House version invoked the WPR more explicitly.204 
The Senate and House versions were never reconciled, however, so the Resolution never 
really became law.   
 
The situation in Somalia want smoothly for the first half of 1993 and the United 
States started to transfer control over the mission to the UN (UNOSOM II) in May 1993.  
UNOSOM II was the result of a new UN Resolution—strongly supported by the Clinton 
administration—that expanded the UN mission in Somalia to include economic 
rehabilitation and political reconciliation.205  By the time the transfer was completed only 
about 4,000 United States troops remained in Somalia.206  There were no American 
casualties during that period and the relief effort seemed to be largely successful.  Public 
opinion polls taken in early 1993 continued to show significant public support for the 
operation.207 
 
By mid-year 1993, the events in Somalia took a decisive turn for the worse.   With 
the significant reduction of the United States military presence after the transfer of 
control to the UN, factional fighting increased in the capital city of Mogadishu and the 
outlying areas.  On June 5, a faction led by Muhammad Farah Aidid ambushed and killed 
23 Pakistani peacekeepers. 208  The UN Security Council denounced the incident and 
ordered the arrest and punishment of all those responsible.209  The United States troops—
who were originally deployed for a disaster relief mission—were ordered to get involved in 
a mission to find and arrest Aidid and his accomplices. 210  But President Clinton never 
sought congressional authorization for this expansion of the role of the U.S. troops.     
 
With the expansion of the UN mission to include tracking down warlords, the 
clashes with Aidid’s forces escalated.  On August, 4 U.S. troops were killed in a bomb 
explosion.211  Then in early September, a U.S. helicopter operation resulted in the death 
of almost 200 Somali citizens, including women and children.212  Moreover, in that same 
period 7 Nigerian peacekeepers were killed.213  In the later part of September a U.S. army 
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Blackhawk helicopter was shot down resulting in the death of 3 U.S. soldiers. 214  By late 
September the public opinion polls in support of the operation had dipped to around 40 
percent.215 
 
As the public opinion in support of the U.S. role in Somalia declined leading 
members of Congress started to demand withdrawal of United States troops.  On 
September 8, 1994, Senator Byrd introduced a bill that would automatically terminate 
funding for the Somalia mission in thirty days unless Congress authorized a continuation 
of the deployment.216  On September 9, the Senate passed a watered down version of 
Senator Byrd’s bill which required the President to notify Congress of the objectives of the 
deployment by October 15, and to seek congressional authorization for a continued 
deployment by November 15. 217  In approving an identical version of the Senate bill on 
September 28, the House purportedly decided to “put the White House on notice that 
Congress is losing patience with a mission that has gone from feeding the starving to 
hunting down a faction leader.”218 
    
In October 1993, the situation in Somalia reached its nadir.  On October 3, 18 
U.S. soldiers were killed and over 70 wounded in a firefight with Aidid’s forces in 
Mogadishu.219  As the television cameras focused on the body of a dead American soldier 
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, public opinion in support of the operation 
eroded dramatically.  In a poll taken on October 7, public support had dropped to 35 
percent from a January high of over 80 percent.220  As public opinion in support of the 
operation declined, congressional pressure for an immediate withdrawal increased.  In 
mid-October the Senate passed a bill that called for the automatic termination of all 
funding for U.S. operations in Somalia by March 31, 1994.221  Later in October 
Congressman Gilman introduced a bill in the House that called for cutting of funding for 
the operation and the withdrawal of all American troops by January 31, 1994.222  Under 
congressional pressure, President Clinton agreed to the March 31, 1994 withdrawal date 
proposed in the Senate bill.223 
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As the model would predict, Congress and the President took radically different 
approaches to the negative turn in public opinion polls after the October incident in 
Mogadishu.   As voices on Capital hill and elsewhere clamored for an immediate 
withdrawal, President Clinton warned that the United States should not cut and run.  
“Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined,” the President insisted, “and all 
around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us 
to change our policies is to kill our people.”224 In the same early October speech President 
Clinton announced that he was going to increase the troop levels from 4,700 to about 
20,000 troops.225  The President acknowledged that in response to the increased military 
capacity of the warlords in Somalia, increased troop levels were needed to prevent 
Somalia from descending into anarchy.226  He acknowledged, however, that he would pull 
out the troops by March 31 but insisted that he would “leave on our terms.”227  He also 
tried to distance the American military role from the UN and clarified that the troops 
would be under U.S. and not UN command.228  
 
The decline in public opinion in support of the war was also consistent with the 
hypothesis that the American public support for the use of force tends to be at its lowest 
ebb when the military engagement involves significant casualties and the primary 
objective of the engagement involves the imposition of internal political change.  Initially, 
when the military objective in Somalia just involved the delivery of humanitarian relief, 
the public support for the operation was significantly high.  When the military objective 
devolved into a manhunt for Aidid, however, the public began to view the U.S. military 
as being drawn into a messy civil war that had no clear U.S. security implications.  The 
President was also hard-pressed to come up with any plausible argument that would 
suggest that the Somali factions involved in this civil war imposed any threat to American 
security.  As depicted in the graph below, public opinion in support of the Somali 
operation was fairly high in the late 1992 and early 1993, but declined significantly in 
September in the wake of the first U.S. casualties and the killing of about 200 Somali 
citizens by U.S. helicopter crews.  It then dropped precipitously after the October firefight 
that killed 18 U.S. soldiers.  
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TABLE 5 
Public Opinion Polls on the United States Intervention in Somalia, 1992-1993 (in 
percentages) 
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Questions:   (1)  Time/CNN Poll:  Do you approve or disapprove of the presence of US troops in Somalia?  (01/13/1993 - 01/14/1993)  (2)  Gallup Poll:  Do you think the US should 
continue its role of active military involvement in Somalia, or should it stop?  (09/10/1993 - 09/12/1993)  Has the operation in Somalia been successful, or unsuccessful?  (10/05/1993)  Do 
you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?  (10/08/1993 - 10/10/1993)  (3) ABC News:  Do you approve or disapprove of Bush's decision to send 
US troops Somalia?  (12/11/92 - 12/14/92)  Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?  (10/05/1993; 10/07/1993; 10/12/1993)  (4) CBS News:  
Do you think the US should be sending US troops to Somalia to try and make sure shipments of food get through to the people there, or should US troops stay out?  (12/06/92)  Do you 
approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?  (10/18/1993 - 10/19/1993)       
Note:  Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.                     
 
 
Finally, congressional reaction to the dip in public opinion polls in fall 1993 was 
also consistent with what the model would predict.  Indeed, in the wake of the October 3 
incident, Senator Dole, the Republican leader announced: “If there were a vote today, 
we’d be out today.” 229 Lawmakers also demanded immediate plans for a Somali exit from 
leading White House officials like Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher.230  Formal congressional action to cut off funds for the operation 
subsequently followed.231  In the end, congressional pressure on the White House seemed 
to work.  However, this congressional victory is subject to qualification.  Given that 
Somalia seemed to pose no clear risk to U.S. security, White House officials did not seem 
overly concerned that a forced withdrawal would hurt the President’s credibility.232  In 
other words, since the American public and foreign governments would likely appreciate 
the lack of any significant U.S. interests in Somalia, the White House presumably 
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concluded that the political risks of a withdrawal under congressional pressure would not 
be that significant.233    
  
  C.  The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
 
In many ways, the 2003 invasion of Iraq is a classic demonstration of the 
President’s unique ability to frame public opinion by escalating an international crisis.   
Indeed, from summer 2002 through mid-2003, Iraq overshadowed most other issues in 
the popular media.  However, the presidential saber-rattling that foisted Iraq into the 
headlines in the fall of 2002 started much earlier; as early as October 2001 presidential 
aides had suggested expanding the war against the Taliban to Iraq.234   President Bush 
subsequently hinted at a link between al-Quada and Iraq in his January 2002 state of the 
union address in which he famously described Iraq as a member of the “axis of evil.”235   
Then in an address to graduating cadets at West Point in early June 2002, the President 
publicly announced the outlines of his new doctrine for preventive action in which he 
urged that it would be necessary for the United States to “take the battle to the enemy, 
disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”236  Later that month 
the Washington Post released a report about a new national security strategy in which the 
President “signed an intelligence order directing the CIA to undertake a comprehensive, 
covert program to topple Saddam Hussein, including authority to use lethal force to 
capture the Iraqi president.” 237 
 
   Although Iraq was already beginning to dominate the headlines by late July 
2002, the President did not take his case for war to the public until later that fall.  Indeed, 
in mid-August the President was still urging a more cautious approach and mentioned he 
was going to “look at all options” available to him before making a decision.238  By later 
that month, however, the administration had changed its tone and was suggesting that 
Iraq’s threat to peace in the region through its potential nuclear programs made the 
removal of Saddam Hussein necessary.239   Like what the model would predict, the 
administration couched the objectives of the war largely in terms of a response to foreign 
aggression: the President insisted that a preemptive strike was necessary because Iraq had 
weapons of mass destruction that it could likely use against the United States and that 
there was a clear link between Iraqi regime and the al-Qaeda terrorists who launched the 
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September 11, 2001 attacks. 240  Moreover, the President made clear that waiting for Iraq 
to act first was not an option:  “The danger is clear: using chemical, biological, or one day, 
nuclear weapons provided by Iraq, the terrorists could one day kill thousands of people in 
our country or any other.”241 
 
  While it is not clear why the White House decided to shift tactics from exploring 
non-use of force options in mid-August, the proximity of a mid-term congressional 
election probably factored heavily in its calculations.  By late August 2002, however, it 
was still unclear whether the President would actually seek congressional authorization 
for the use of force.  Like his predecessors, including Reagan, Clinton, and his father, 
President Bush initially disclaimed any constitutional role for Congress and argued that 
he could embark on the use of force solely on the authority of his role as commander-in-
chief.242   The political background in which presidents usually make such 
pronouncements suggest that it is a tactical move:  the President initially declines to 
concede Congress’s constitutional authority to approve the use of force in order to avoid 
establishing legal or political precedent for President acquiescence, but then subsequently 
seeks congressional approval ostensibly on political grounds.  In other words, presidents 
seem to prefer to seek congressional approval for the use of force in a context in which it 
does not look like they are bound by a constitutional requirement. In any event, by early 
September the President requested congressional authorization to go to war in Iraq but 
insisted that such authorization take place immediately.   Furthermore, polls conducted 
around that time revealed that a majority of Americans did not want the President to go 
to war without congressional authorization.243   
 
With the mid-term elections around the corner, President Bush’s decision to seek 
immediate congressional authorization for the Iraqi invasion in September 2002 turned 
out to be a good tactical move.  In the weeks before he requested congressional 
authorization, the White House aggressively mobilized public opinion by making public 
pronouncements that an invasion of Iraq was imminent.244   At the time there were deep 
divisions regarding the propriety of unilateral action against Iraq in prominent circles, 
including among leading Republic foreign policy experts. 245  Given these divisions, it was 
important for the President to get a vote on the war before the election when members of 
Congress were most politically vulnerable, otherwise a protracted congressional debate 
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about the merits of the war would likely ensue in January.  Although the public opinion 
polls at the time did not necessarily endorse unilateral action by the United States, 
members of Congress were probably aware that an extensive debate about the merits of 
the war would not play in their favor in the mid-term election.  Indeed, members of 
Congress, especially those in the opposition, likely thought it would be in their electoral 
interests to quickly approve the President’s request because they did not want to appear 
hesitant and weak on national security issues—especially in the aftermath of September 
11.246  For those democratic members of Congress who had presidential political 
aspirations, support for the use of force against Iraq came early and it was largely 
unequivocal.247  
 
  On October 7, 2002, days just before Congress voted on the Iraq Resolution, 
President Bush once again went public to make his case for war and declared in a thirty-
minute speech that “confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on 
terror.” 248  A few days later a significant majority in the House—296-133—approved the 
Resolution and it passed by an even more significant margin in the Senate—77-23.249  
Although there were some Democratic critics against the Resolution, such as Senator 
Robert Byrd of West Virginia, a majority of Democratic members of Congress voted with 
their Republican colleagues.  Byrd had been an early and vocal opponent of the use of 
force since February 2002,250 but his position did not seem to resonate strongly among his 
colleagues.  In many respects, Senator Byrd has been somewhat of an institutional 
iconoclast on the use of force—having openly opposed presidential war-powers initiatives 
since the Vietnam conflict.  But most members of Congress do not enjoy Senator Byrd’s 
inscrutable stature as a politician; and since these other elected officials are likely to be 
more electorally vulnerable than Senator Byrd they probably decided it unwise to stand in 
the way of the President’s national security agenda.  Rather than insist on their 
institutional war-powers prerogative, these politically cautious members of Congress 
probably calculated that it was more prudent to focus their attention on domestic issues 
like the economy and health care—issues that would presumably be more relevant to 
their political fortunes in the November elections. 251  
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The President’s reaction to the public opinion polls in favor of the war was 
consistent with what the model would predict.  Initially, the President’s selling of the war 
to the American public was not easy.   Despite initial tepid support for an Iraqi invasion, 
the President waged an aggressive public relations campaign that focused on the 
imminence of the danger imposed by Saddam Hussein and his historical belligerence in 
the face of multilateral sanctions.   Although the polls showed support for the President’s 
handling of the situation in Iraq during much of the fall of 2002 through March 2003, a 
majority also thought that that the United States should only go to war against Iraq with 
UN support.252   Nonetheless, despite reservations in the polls about the United States 
proceeding unilaterally, by early September a significant majority of Americans indicated 
that they thought that a war against Iraq was inevitable.253  By late February, as 
diplomatic efforts seemed to fail, more Americans seemed resigned to the prospect that a 
UN-approved intervention was no longer possible and public support in favor of a US-led 
intervention increased.254  Once the war actually started on March 19, support for the war 
hit the 70 percent mark and stayed there for the course of the war.255  On March 20, the 
U.S. Senate voted 99-0 in support of the President’s invasion of Iraq. 256    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the elected party leaders calculated that their future electoral success would be greatest if they ‘changed the 
subject’ diverting attention away from security and Iraq and toward other issues like the economy”).  
252 See CBS/NY TIMES Poll, October 20-21, 2002 (63 percent preferred to wait). 
253 See Adam Clymer & Janet Elder, Threats and Responses:  Poll Finds Unease on Terror Fight and 
Concerns About War on Iraq, NY TIMES, September 8, 2002, at __ 
254 See Tom Zeller, The Nation: Reading the Polls, New York Times, February 23, 2003, at 5. 
255 See CBS/NY TIMES Polls, March 20-21, April 11-13 & May 9-12, 2002 in Table 6 infra .  Adam 
Nagourney & Janet Elder, A Nation at War: The Poll; Support for Bush Surges at Home, But Split Remains, NY 
TIMES, March 23, 2003 at 1.  
256See Eric Schmitt & Steven Weisman, A Nation at War; House Joins Senate In Praising Troops, NY 
TIMES, April 11, 2003, at A1.  
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art13
 A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution 55 
TABLE 6 
Public Opinion Polls on the United States Invasion of Iraq, 2002-2003 (in percentages) 
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Questions:   (1)  CBS News:  Do you approve or disapprove of the US taking military action against Iraq to try and remove Saddam Hussein from power?  (8/6/02 - 8/7/02;  9/22/02 - 
9/23/02;  10/27/02 - 10/31/02;  11/20/02 - 11/24/02;  1/4/03 - 1/6/03);  Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the situation with Iraq?  (2/10/03 - 2/12/03;  
3/7/03 - 3/9/03;  3/15/03 - 3/16/03;  4/11/03 - 4/13/03;  5/9/03 - 5/12/03;  7/8/03 - 7/9/03;  9/15/03 - 9/16/03;  10/20/03 - 10/21/03;  12/14/03 - 12/16/03)       
Note:  Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.                    
 
 
Rather than let the public opposition for unilateral action fester in the build-up to 
the invasion of Iraq, President Bush undertook a broad initiative to convince the public 
that he had exhausted diplomatic options and that Hussein’s regime constituted an 
imminent threat.   Through a combination of high profile speeches before the war and 
carefully orchestrated televised programs that showed possible nuclear and chemical 
weapons facilities, President Bush was able to overcome public skepticism of unilateral 
intervention.   President Bush was also able to sell the invasion as a multilateral 
intervention—even in the absence of a UN Resolution—by assembling a “coalition of the 
willing.”257   The rapid and overwhelming nature of the U.S. led coalition’s victory 
eventually cemented public approval for the war.  At the conclusion of the main ground 
war, a significant percentage of Americans expressed confidence that war went well.  
Indeed, public opinion polls by Gallup in April showed that a majority of Americans said 
the war would still be justified even if the U.S. did not discover any weapons of mass 
destruction.258    
 
Although the Iraq invasion officially ended about a month after it started, the 
military activities in Iraq are still ongoing and it is hard to predict whether public support 
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for the “nation-building” aspect of the intervention will last.  As the experience with the 
1982-1983 Lebanese intervention shows, the American public tends not to have a strong 
appetite for prolonged military engagements, especially when there are significant 
casualties and where the perceived threat to the United States’ security interest is not 
obvious.  Public support for the Iraqi invasion has declined somewhat significantly from 
its peak levels in April 2003, although the President received a bump in December 2003 
after the capture of Saddam Hussein.  The model predicts that if public support for the 
invasion falls below 50 percent for a sustained period of time (let us say two months), 
congressional intervention in support of a troop withdrawal is very likely.   Nonetheless, 
in the shadow of the terrorist attacks of September 11, a majority of Americans still give 
President Bush high marks for his efforts in combating international terrorism.  Indeed, 
during the 2004 election campaign, President Bush maintained a consistent lead over his 
Democratic challenger on the question of whom Americans trusted more on the issue of 
national security and fighting terrorism—a factor that likely contributed to the President’s 
2004 reelection victory.259  
 
D.  The Cases That do Not Seem to Conform to the Model 
 
The build-up to all the conflicts described in the foregoing case studies were all 
consistent with what a political insurance and signaling model would predict.  But there 
are a variety of other uses of force (or decisions not to use force) that one cannot easily 
harmonize with the stylized political insurance or signaling model.  This Section addresses 
three such cases: the Korean war of the 1950s; the Cuban missile crisis of 1963; and the 
1999 military intervention in Kosovo. 
 
At first blush, the American military intervention in Korea that started in 1950 
seems like an anomaly because it involved a high stakes conflict in which the President 
did not obtain prior congressional authorization.260  With respect to the political 
insurance that congressional authorization accords, however, one could argue that 
President Truman acquired enough such insurance by successfully securing the approval 
of the UN Security Council before he started deploying troops in the region.261  But in the 
modern era presidents have still sought congressional authorization for the use of force 
even after the obtaining approval of the UN Security Council.262   In any event, however, 
there is less to the lack of formal congressional authorization for the Korean conflict than 
meets the eye.  Although Congress never formally authorized U.S. involvement in the 
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262 For instance, President Bush’s decision to repel Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991 both received 
UN Security approval and authorization from Congress.  See HESS, supra note __ at 162-63; 189-90. 
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Korean crisis, congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle publicly endorsed 
President Truman’s commitment of troops. 263  Indeed, Truman actually sought to present 
the Korean crisis to Congress but was repeatedly rebuffed by legislative leaders who told 
him that it was unnecessary to seek congressional authorization for what was already a 
really popular decision.264   Robert Taft, a Republican Senator from Ohio, did publicly 
challenge the constitutionality of President Truman’s action on the Senate floor, but he 
also made it clear that had President Truman sought congressional authorization, he 
would have voted for it.265  In the end, there is sufficient evidence that Congress had 
endorsed the Korean crisis informally even if it did not do so through formal legislative 
action.  
 
One of the gravest foreign policy crises of the post-WWII era was the Cuban 
missile crisis of 1963.   Yet President Kennedy did not formally seek congressional 
authorization before making his decision to mount a blockade to induce the removal of 
Soviet missiles from Cuba.266  Moreover, President Kennedy decided not to use force 
against the Cubans or the Soviets in the midst of a rapidly escalating crisis and yet he did 
not seem to suffer any domestic audience costs.  Indeed, the public opinion polls at the 
time overwhelmingly endorsed President Kennedy’s decision to mount a blockade against 
Soviet ships. 267   
 
A broader examination of the Cuban missile crisis yields some factors that go a 
long way in reconciling some of the apparent inconsistencies between that crisis with 
what the political insurance and signaling model would predict.  First, the Cuban missile 
crisis ostensibly involved an international crisis that was foisted upon the United States in 
which the President had little choice but to react.  Indeed, President Kennedy 
purportedly viewed presidential inaction on the Cuban Missile Crisis as possible basis for 
                                                 
263 See HESS, supra note __ at 24. 
264 As one scholar notes, Truman’s efforts to seek a congressional role in the Korean conflict were 
shunned by leading legislators: 
(C)ontrary to popular misconception, President Truman did not "ignore" Congress. On 
the contrary, he played it by the book, repeatedly consulting personally with the joint leadership of 
Congress, asking specifically whether he should seek a declaration of war, and instructing the 
Department of State to draft a resolution in case they felt it appropriate. Truman repeatedly 
expressed a desire to address a joint session of Congress about what was going on in Korea. 
But everywhere he turned, Congressional leaders told him that he had ample authority 
under the Constitution and under the Charter to do what he was doing, and they went further and 
told him that he should "stay away" from Congress. 
Malvina Haberstam, The U.S. Right to Use Force in Response to the Attacks on the Pentagon and the 
World Trade Center , 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 865, 869 (2004). 
265 See HESS, supra note __ at 26. 
266 For a brief synopsis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, see “An Overview of the Crisis,” available at 
hht://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days.index.html; see also GRAHAM ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: 
EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971).   
267 See Tom W. Smith, The Polls-Trends: The Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S. Public Opinion, 67 
PUBLIC OPINION Q 265, 269-70 (2003). 
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impeachment.268  Thus, unlike most of the conventional use of force cases, the President 
did not play an active role in creating or escalating the Cuban missile crisis. 269  One could 
argue that when a foreign adversary commits acts of aggression on U.S. soil, or in close 
proximity to U.S. soil, the President may have no option but to react by using force or 
taking decisive measures short of using force.  Because it is almost certain that the 
President will react in those situations, the signaling value or the political insurance 
afforded by congressional authorization for the use of force diminishes.  Thus, in those 
instances where the President has responded to attacks on U.S. soil—such as in WWII 
after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor or in Afghanistan after the September 11 
terrorist attacks—the President could have plausibly dispensed with congressional 
authorization without suffering significant domestic audience costs.   
 
Second, President Kennedy’s choice of a blockade rather than a use of force 
during the Cuban missile crisis also makes sense because a use of force could have 
resulted in a nuclear showdown between the Soviet Union and the United States. 270   All 
else equal, the domestic audience will likely not prefer a use of force incident when the 
prospects of prevailing in a military engagement are trivial.  Given that a full-fledged war 
between the Soviet Union and the United States would in all likelihood be unwinnable by 
either side, public opinion polls at the time showed a strong preference for a reaction to 
the crisis that would fall short of a use of force.271    In the end, not only did the President 
Kennedy’s blockade satisfy the public’s demand for decisive action, it ostensibly achieved 
the goal of preventing the further shipment of Soviet missiles to Cuba.272  In any event, 
unlike the superpower confrontation at stake during the Cuban missile crisis, the United 
States is not likely to confront such a formidable foe in routine use of force decisions.   
 
Finally, the American military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 also presents 
somewhat of a challenge to the political insurance/signaling model.  In March 1999, 
President Clinton ordered air strikes against Serbian forces in Kosovo in order to protect 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo from Serbian aggression and also to persuade Serbian forces 
                                                 
268 Robert Kennedy, who was then Attorney-General, reported this colloquy he had with his 
brother regarding the risk of confronting the Soviet Union over the crisis.  Robert Kennedy: “I just don’t 
think there was any choice .. and not only that, if you hadn’t you would have been impeached.”  President 
Kennedy: “That’s what I think . . . I would have been impeached.”  (quoted in Richard Lebow, The Cuban 
Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly, 98 POL. SC. Q 431, 433 (1983)).  
269 See, e.g., Fearon, supra note __ at 579 (“Historically, war has virtually followed from the 
deliberate choice of state leaders, if not always as the result they originally intended.”) 
270 See ALLISON, supra note __ at 59 (“An invasion would force American troops to confront 
20,000 Soviets in the Cold War’s first case of direct contact between troops of the superpowers.  Such 
brinkmanship courted nuclear disaster, practically guaranteeing an equivalent move against Berlin”).  
271 See Smith, supra note __ at 271 (observing that public opinion polls showed that 83 percent 
approved of the blockade decision while a consistent majority opposed the invasion of Cuba).  
272 See id.  Allison characterizes the blockade choice as the optimal middle ground: “It was a middle 
course between inaction and attack, aggressive enough to communicate firmness of intention, but still not 
so precipitous as a strike.” ALLISON, supra note __ at 61.  
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to accept NATO’s presence in the region.273  Congress never formally approved the 
Kosovo operation and President Clinton justified his unilateral action as an exercise of his 
constitutional authority as chief executive and commander in chief.274   The 
constitutionality of President Clinton’s Kosovo decision eventually became the basis of 
lawsuit filed by Representative Thomas Campbell and about two-dozen other members of 
Congress. 275 
 
While Kosovo seems like a separation of powers anomaly, certain factors suggest 
that it could be reconciled with a political insurance model.  First, the Kosovo crisis was 
not a particularly high risk engagement because it mostly involved aerial attacks without 
any significant commitment of ground troops.  Second, President Clinton received some 
congressional political insurance when the Senate (but not the House) passed a 
resolution two days before he ordered the attack authorizing the President to conduct 
military air operations in conjunction with other NATO forces. 276  Furthermore, the 
House, which failed to support the Senate resolution authorizing the use of force, 
subsequently defeated a resolution that would have required the President to remove all 
troops from Yugoslavia.277  Finally, Congress also agreed to increase funding for the 
Kosovo operation,278 although it never formally authorized the war. 
 
In many respects, the Kosovo intervention represents a low-level international 
crisis in which the President sought and obtained from Congress a form of low-level 
political insurance.  Because the intervention involved mostly aerial attacks on Serbian 
targets, it did not represent a significant enough threat in terms of potential casualties to 
American troops to warrant full-blown political insurance from Congress.  Thus, while 
President Clinton was not averse to formal congressional approval, he probably 
recognized that the political risks of the intervention did not necessarily require it.  
Moreover, given that Congress was willing to increase funding for the intervention and 
that the Senate had already passed a resolution supporting the use of force, the President 
likely thought he had sufficient political insurance to engage in a limited aerial bombing 
campaign.   
 
 
 
                                                 
273 For a brief factual background of the Kosovo intervention, see Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 29 
(2000).  For an analysis of the international law and constitutional implications of the Kosovo intervention, 
see John Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future , 148 U. PA. L. REV 1673 (2000).  
274 See Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 35 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 527-28 (Mar. 26, 1999).   
275 See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 29-30; see also Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37 (D.D.C. 
1999). 
276 S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999). 
277 See H.R. Con. Re s. 82, 106th Cong. (1999).  The House did reject the Senate resolution 
authorizing the conflict by a tie vote of 213 to 213.  Moreover, the House also rejected a resolution 
providing for the declaration of war by a vote of 427 to 2.  See H.R.J. Res. 44, 106th Cong. (1999).  
278 See 1999 Emergency Supp. Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-31, tit 11, ch. 3, 113 Stat. 57 
(1999) (providing funds for operations for operations in Yugoslavia).    
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III.    IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY FOR NORMATIVE WAR POWERS 
SCHOLARSHIP 
 
The widespread assumption that pervades much of the normative war powers 
scholarship and judicial commentary is that the President and Congress are in a perpetual 
battle for supremacy in foreign affairs. 279  Both sides of the war powers debate have 
conceded that the President has won this battle.280   But the battle for supremacy 
assumption is mistaken.  Congress is not an empire builder in war powers; in most 
instances the incentives of individual members of Congress may actually be flatly 
inconsistent with that of increasing the overall institutional prerogative of Congress.  This 
Article has shown that when the President first initiates an international crisis, public 
opinion usually supports the President’s preferred course of military action.  The positive 
electoral payoffs that come from piggybacking on the President’s national security agenda 
means that members of Congress have a strong incentive to initially support the 
President’s use of force decisions regardless as to whether those decisions diminish the 
overall institutional prerogatives of Congress.  But when public opinion turns against the 
President’s conduct of a war, members of Congress have political incentives to constrain 
the President’s national security initiatives.  As discussed in the two sections below, 
suggestions that the courts or Congress mandate a more specific division of war powers 
authority are unlikely to alter these political incentives.   
 
This Article does not mean to suggest that all normative scholarship embraces a 
bright-line approach to the allocation of war powers or assumes that a struggle for 
institutional supremacy is undesirable.  Indeed, pro-President scholars like John Yoo have 
argued that both the constitutional text and structure support a much more flexible 
approach to war powers in which both Congress and the President can compete for 
control over war-making.281  Yoo also points to historical sources that suggest that such a 
flexible approach to war powers is also consistent with the original understanding.282  
Although Yoo does not seek to explain the war powers interactions between Congress 
                                                 
279 See Daryl Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV.  915, 
915-17 (2005) (discussing prevalence of empire-building approach in separation of powers scholarship).  
280 Pro-President scholars are largely happy with this outcome and argue that increased executive 
power in war powers is consistent with both the political realities of modern warfare and the original 
constitutional design.  See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 7 (2002) (suggesting that a functional reading of 
the Constitution supports the vesting of broad foreign affairs authority in the executive branch).   Pro-
Congress scholars understandably bemoan legislative impotence and often offer elaborate recommendations 
for re-equilibrating this perceived imbalance in war powers authority. See, e.g., ELY,  WAR AND 
RESPONSIBILITY , supra note _ at 3-10; 139-52; KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION, supra note 
__ at 74-77;  Michael Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers,  69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1559-60 (2002); 
Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 674-
75 (1972) 
281 See John Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text , 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1643 (2002); John Yoo, 
Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1221 (1999). 
282 Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text , supra note __ at 1648-1660. 
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and the President, the normative vision he depicts seems to accord with much of the 
reality of political branch interaction on war powers.  However, while Yoo seems to be less 
sanguine about a more assertive congressional role in war powers, 283 the evidence does 
show that members of Congress do play a more prominent role in constraining the 
President’s decision to use force when there are electoral incentives for doing so.   
 
The rest of this Article argues that the most of the conventional prescriptions for 
addressing the lack of congressional assertiveness in war powers are unlikely to work given 
certain realities of political branch interaction in foreign affairs. 
 
A. Why Congress Does not Have an Incentive to Change the Balance of War 
Powers  
 
 The starting point for much of the literature regarding the proper division 
of war powers is usually an effort to apply traditional interpretive canons of constitutional 
law to the textual language that discusses the authority to conduct war.   For instance, 
references abound in the war powers literature to canonical phrases like original intent, 
formalism, textualism, and functionalism.  The assumption is that after positing what the 
proper division should be, the relevant institutional parties, such as Congress and the 
President, would then adjust their behavior to fit the outcome dictated by the specific 
interpretive canon.  Thus, some pro-Congress scholars have argued that Congress should 
develop tools to reassert its institutional powers and re-equilibrate the perceived 
imbalance in war powers authority. 284 
 
 
In much of this normative war powers scholarship, a logically antecedent question 
is rarely addressed: If the courts are not likely to be involved in war powers controversies, 
why do we care about interpretive canons that are almost exclusively employed by the 
courts? 285 Or to phrase the question a little differently, why would we expect the political 
branches that usually make decisions about the allocation of war powers to care about 
                                                 
283 See id. at 1664 (observing that WPR has been weak in constraining executive authority and 
suggesting that the constitutionality of the WPR is questionable).   
284 See e.g., KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION, supra note __ at 185-207 (suggesting 
elaborate legislative proposals to give congressional role more bite in war powers).  
285 Interestingly, however, many of the arguments supporting a specific allocation of war powers 
authority are phrased in a manner that almost beckons for judicial resolution.  In other words, like many of 
the normative debates in other areas of constitutional law, the primary audience for much of this 
scholarship seems to be the courts.  But the courts are a very peculiar audience for such scholarship because 
most constitutional law scholars would agree that the courts have played a fairly marginal role in resolving 
legal disputes over the allocation of war powers.  See KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION, supra 
note __ at 146-49 (noting the propensity of courts to refuse to hear challenges to executive authority on 
foreign affairs).  Admittedly, the normative thrust of some of the war-powers scholarship is a quest to get 
the courts more involved, see ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY,  supra note __ at 54-67, but even the most 
ardent proponents of judicial intervention in war powers would admit that courts are hardly the panacea to 
the problems they describe. 
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such interpretive canons?  Presumably, many constitutional scholars would say that they 
should care because these interpretive canons provide mechanisms for discovering what 
the constitutional text specifically prescribes.   But hardly any of the political branches 
would concede that they are simply ignoring the Constitution when they make war 
powers decisions.   The more relevant question is whether the political branches should 
coordinate around any specific interpretive approach in circumstances where the 
constitutional text may be subject to different interpretations.  Mysteriously, none of the 
normative war powers scholarship seems to discuss why the political branches would have 
any incentives to take interpretive canons seriously.   For instance, does either Congress 
or the President really have any incentive to adhere to either historical fidelity under the 
originalist approach, or to other non-historical considerations under a more functionalist 
approach?     
 
The answer is probably not.  From a judicial perspective, one of the great virtues 
of interpretive canons is that they encourage stability in the law even if the courts do not 
all agree on the best one.286  Indeed, some commentators have observed that the 
institutional incentive that courts have in maintaining stability in legal interpretation 
makes them better interpreters of the constitution than the political branches. 287 
Understandably, however, interpretive stability hardly seems to be a virtue for members of 
Congress who are subject to the whims of public opinion and face reelection concerns. 288    
Indeed, because members of Congress are not bound by the same institutional incentives 
that encourage interpretive stability in the judicial branch, some commentators have 
argued that Congress may actually have an institutional advantage over the courts in 
interpreting those constitutional norms that change over time. 289  
 
                                                 
286 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term--Foreword: Law 
as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 67 (1994) ("The usefulness of the canons ...does not depend upon the 
Court's choosing the 'best' canons for each proposition. Instead, the canons may be understood as 
conventions, similar to driving a car on the right-hand side of the road; often it is not as important to 
choose the best convention as it is to choose one convention, and stick to it."). 
287 See, e.g., Larry Alxander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1372-75 (1997). 
288 As one member of Congress being surveyed for a scholarly article put it: "Being a political body, 
Congress better have a different approach [to interpretation] or else they'll get voted out of office. Judges 
have life appointments. If members were elected for life then maybe this would be different."  Bruce G. 
Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative 
Attitudes, 1959-2001, 29 Law & Soc. Inq. 127, 162 (2004). 
289 See Peabody, supra note ___ at 161 (“While courts were somewhat slow to adapt their 
interpretation to changing social and political conditions (given, among other factors, their relative 
insulation from the public and the other branches), Congress could serve as an agent of innovation, 
ensuring that the Constitution applied to contemporary concerns.”); Neal K. Katyal, Legislative 
Constitutional Interpretation, 50 Duke L.J. 1335, 1341 (2001) (“"Congress . . . frequently makes 
determinations as to shifts in popular opinion, beliefs, and ideals. Because of Congress's structural 
superiority in these tasks, it should take a larger role in interpreting those clauses of the Constitution that 
are meant to evolve over time."); see also  Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs , 89 Iowa L. Rev. 
941, 980 (2004) (“[B]ecause the political branches are not bound by the same institutional constraints the 
courts face, they are better positioned to respond to changing norms in international relations.”) 
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In any event, given the presidential dominance of the national security agenda in 
most circumstances, Congress has an incentive to adopt an even more flexible approach 
to constitutional disputes regarding the allocation of war powers.  In other words, since 
the President can easily shape public opinion at the initiation of a conflict, members of 
Congress are likely going to resist any effort to take a “bright line” approach to 
constitutional interpretation on war powers issues.  Members of Congress are aware that 
“bright line” rules that mandate congressional intervention under certain circumstances 
are likely to expose them to unpredictable and considerable electoral risks.   
 
Moreover, to the extent that members of Congress engage in constitutional 
interpretation about the separation of powers at all, they apparently tend to rely more on 
local constituency feedback and political considerations in determining the meaning of 
textual provisions. 290  Since members of Congress usually operate with limited legislative 
resources and crowded schedules, they are more likely to focus their attention on those 
constitutional issues that directly involve local and constituent concerns like federalism, 
separation of church and state, and individual rights issues. 291  Constitutional questions of 
foreign affairs do not seem to factor heavily as a congressional concern.292 
 
Not only do electoral factors dissuade members of Congress from adopting 
interpretive canons that encourage stable rules, they also dissuade them from taking 
proactive legislative positions that would impose such bright line rules.  For instance, 
despite increasing calls by commentators to amend the War Powers Resolution to give it 
more bite, very few members of Congress have ever expressed any interest in expanding 
the congressional role under that statute.  On the contrary, influential members of 
Congress have actually lobbied rigorously to repeal the Resolution or radically narrow its 
scope.  Indeed, some of the most vocal support for legislative repeal has come from 
members of Congress who were not even from the President’s party.  For instance, both 
Robert Dole and Henry Hyde—leading Republican members of Congress—introduced 
legislation in 1995 that would repeal the Resolution under Clinton’s presidency.293   Newt 
Gingrich, the speaker of the house at the time, actively campaigned for Representative 
Hyde’s amendment and encouraged his fellow Republican members of Congress to take 
the unusual step of “increas[ing] the power of President Clinton.”294 
 
But Congress’s reluctance in imposing bright line rules does not necessarily 
translate to wholesale legislative abdication in the war powers realm.  This Article has 
                                                 
290 As one scholar analyzing Congressional approaches to constitutional interpretation put it: 
“[M]embers of Congress [felt they] had a greater responsibility to apply and ‘assess the real world impact of 
[constitutional questions" including policy consequences and the likely reaction of the public.”  Peabody, 
supra note ___ at 161. 
291 See id.  at 150-51. 
292 See id. at 148, 150.  
293 Robert Dole proposed replacing the resolution with what he called the Peace Powers Act of 
1995, which in his words would “untie the President’s hands in using American forces to defend American 
interests.”  Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1995, at A 10.  
294 141 Cong. Rec. H5648-01 (June 7, 1995).  
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shown that Congress will often employ a combination of both informal and formal 
mechanisms to constrain executive action in foreign affairs provided that there are 
discernible political payoffs for doing so.  Thus, it is not true to suggest, as some 
commentators have, that “the President almost always seems to win in foreign affairs.”295   
To the contrary, members of Congress may often prefer to negotiate the division of war 
powers authority with the President using informal political approaches where formal 
legislative tools may prove to be either inadequate or politically imprudent.    Hence, the 
absence of formal statutory rules that establish bright line rules in war powers does not 
mean that the President always has the upper hand, it simply means that one ought to 
look elsewhere for a better understanding of political branch interaction in war powers.  
 
In sum, it is unlikely that the interpretive canons of constitutional law can play a 
significant role in informing the distribution of war powers.  As long as courts continue to 
decline to play an active role in war powers controversies, both the President and 
Congress have institutional incentives to prefer an open-ended and flexible approach to 
the allocation of war powers authority.  Members of Congress may prefer to shift most of 
the political risks of initially going to war to the President but then reserve the option of 
intervention if the war takes a wrong turn and becomes politically unpopular.  For their 
part, presidents may also want the flexibility of seeking a more active congressional role if 
they perceive a significant risk of failure in their war initiatives but then go alone when 
the expected costs of war are low.   In many circumstances, the institutional incentives for 
both branches may run in opposite directions, but the solutions they will likely choose will 
not involve the imposition of bright line rules. 
 
 
B.  Why the Courts are Unlikely to Tip the Balance of War     
Powers in Congress’s Favor  
 
Congress has for prudent political reasons often declined to use its formal powers 
to constrain the President in war powers issues.  But even if members of Congress seem to 
face significant domestic audience constraints in participating in war-powers issues, one 
might ask why the courts do not intervene to level the policy-making playing field.  
Indeed, one oft-cited antidote to the perceived “imperial” actions of the President in the 
war powers realm is judicial intervention.296  Judicial intervention, it is commonly argued, 
will tip the institutional balance of powers in Congress’s favor and encourage it to exercise 
its war powers prerogative.297  
 
There are two compelling reasons why courts have resisted, and will likely 
continue to resist, intervening in war powers disputes: (1) due to the political calculus 
                                                 
295 Harold Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra 
Affair, 97 YALE L J. 1255, 1317 (1988). 
296 See ELY,  WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY , supra note __ at 54-67; KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
CONSTITUTION, supra note __ at 222-28. 
297 See ELY,  WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY , supra note __ at 54-67. 
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that many members of Congress face, the courts usually assume that it is unlikely that 
there is a genuine confrontation between the two political branches on war powers 
disputes; and (2) the courts are probably reluctant to intervene in inter-branch disputes 
in a sphere where they might have low institutional authoritativeness.  
 
On the first point, the courts have been generally reluctant to protect legislative 
prerogatives in war powers when members of Congress have failed to do so.  Indeed, given 
that many members of Congress often have political incentives not to confront the 
President on war powers controversies, many of the disputes regarding the division of war-
powers that come before the courts routinely involve what are essentially intra-legislative 
disputes where a segment of Congress (often a minority) seems to disagree with the 
majority’s decision.  In most such cases a majority of Congress has either explicitly 
accepted the President’s national security agenda or has implicitly acquiesced to the 
agenda without taking formal legislative action.  In other words, in those cases there has 
not been a genuine constitutional impasse that might appropriately trigger court scrutiny.   
Courts, probably anticipating the political spoils at stake, decline to participate in a 
“political pass the blame” game by insisting that the courts will not do what Congress 
refuses to do for itself.298    
 
Where members of Congress are unwilling to constrain executive branch 
authority through legislation, courts understandably recognize that judicial intervention 
might prove to be meaningless.  First, where there is insufficient congressional support for 
a court decision that favors congressional intervention in war powers, members of 
Congress will very likely lack the political will to implement such a decision.   In other 
words, members of Congress who fear that greater congressional intervention will expose 
them to electoral risks will have every incentive to sidestep a judicial ruling that awards 
them more powers in national security affairs.    
 
Second, courts will often lack the opportunity to monitor effectively the successful 
implementation of a bright-line judicial rule regarding the allocation of war powers.  
Judicial monitoring will often be difficult because there are so many procedural and 
jurisdictional hurdles to bringing a legal challenge to the allocation of war powers.  Since 
most citizens will lack standing to bring the lawsuit, most such lawsuits will probably have 
to come from members of Congress.  But even if disaffected members of Congress are able 
to overcome significant standing obstacles of their own,299 they are still likely to face a 
                                                 
298 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (“If the Congress chooses not to 
confront the President, it is not our task to do so.”) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Campbell v. Clinton, 
203 F.3d 29 (2000) (holding that Congressmen challenging constitutionality of Kosovo intervention did not 
have legislative standing because legislative remedies were still available).  
299 Under current Supreme Court doctrine, legislative standing is available only when legislators’ 
votes have been completely nullified by the act of the president such as when there “constitutional impasse” 
between President and Congress.  See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997). 
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slew of other procedural obstacles, including ripeness,300 mootness,301 and the political 
question doctrine.302    
 
Thus, although greater political branch collaboration on use of force issues might 
be normatively desirable, those who argue that judicial intervention will prompt Congress 
to take a more active role in war powers are probably wrong.  Members of Congress are 
not likely going to embrace a war powers role that has significant electoral risks simply 
because such a role has been judicially sanctioned.  Indeed, not only will members of 
Congress lack an incentive to comply with such judicial decisions but judicial monitoring 
of legislative compliance will often prove very difficult to carry out.  At most, if compelled 
to take on a more active role by a judicial decision when it is not in their political interest 
to do so, members of Congress will likely substitute legislative rubberstamping for silent 
acquiescence as the preferred response to the President’s use of force initiatives.  In sum, 
if greater political accountability for use of force decisions is the end goal, there is little 
evidence that judicially-prompted congressional intervention will change the current war 
powers landscape.   
 
Finally, the risk of non-compliance with judicial decisions also implicates the 
institutional legitimacy of the courts to adjudicate on war powers claims.  As some 
commentators have observed, courts seem to be especially wary about intervening in 
separation of powers issues in foreign affairs because the popular legitimacy that underlies 
judicial Resolution of domestic constitutional disputes does not tend to extend to foreign 
affairs disputes. 303  In other words, when issues involve the adjudication of individual 
rights claims or domestic separation of powers disputes, courts can often tap into the 
popular acceptance of their role in resolving such disputes.304  In disputes regarding the 
allocation of war powers, however, it is unlikely that the judicial branch will be able to 
draw on the popular underpinnings of its legitimacy to secure political branch compliance 
with its decisions because there does not seem to much of a public appetite for increased 
judicial involvement in foreign affairs disputes. 305 Moreover, unlike in the domestic realm 
where the courts play a key legitimating function in separation of powers disputes, the 
                                                 
300 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (observing that in 
disputes between the political branches have to be ripe for adjudication -- meaning there must be a true 
"impasse" between the branches).  
301 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (holding that "a case is moot when the 
issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome."). 
 
302 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (listing six factors courts may use to determine if a 
case presents a non-justiciable political question); see also Nzelibe, supra note __ at 946-65 (discussing 
widespread application of political question doctrine in foreign affairs cases).  
303 See Nzelibe, supra note __ at 987-92; Eyal Benvenisti, Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on 
the Institut de Droit International’s Resolution on “The Activities of National Courts and International Relations of 
their State, 5 Eur. J. Int’l L 423, 426 (1994). 
304 See Nzelibe, supra note __ at 987-89. 
305 See id. at 989-90. 
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political branches have very little incentive to embrace a more active judicial role in 
disputes over the allocation of war powers. 306   
 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
For too long, the war powers literature has ignored the sometimes divergent 
incentives the political branches face in the context of an imminent military conflict or 
international crisis.  Indeed, much of that literature has tended to have a strong 
normative gloss informed by conventional interpretive canons like textualism, 
functionalism, or historicism.  To the extent that this literature attempts to explain 
political branch interaction in foreign affairs at all, it often assumes an “empire-building” 
agenda by the relevant domestic actors.  According to this view, the President has 
prevailed in the institutional struggle for supremacy in war powers largely because 
Congress has found itself without the proper tools to assert its constitutional prerogative.  
For proponents of increased congressional authority in war powers, the antidote to this 
perceived institutional imbalance is to have the judiciary step in and act as a bulwark 
against President’s intrusion on Congress’s war powers prerogatives.  
 
This Article suggests that the reality of political branch interaction on war powers 
is much too complex to correspond to the prescriptions of any particular canon of 
constitutional theory.  In other words, despite the prospects of institutional tweaking by 
the courts or Congress, the political branches are not likely to have much of an incentive 
to conform their actions to what any specific interpretive canon prescribes, unless such a 
canon prescribes open-ended flexibility.  Rather, the political branches operate in an 
atmosphere where their institutional or constitutional prerogatives do not often align 
neatly with the electoral incentives of individual institutional actors.   
 
In this atmosphere, far from being hamstrung by its institutional arsenal, Congress 
has demonstrated that it is quite capable of constraining executive authority on the use of 
force when the electoral conditions are ripe.  Thus, while members of Congress may be 
understandably reluctant to challenge the President’s authority at the initiation of a 
conflict, they seem willing to constrain him in the shadow of a recent unpopular use of 
force.  Because of an academic bias towards formal congressional actions, however, much 
of the legal scholarship has actually underestimated the diverse ways in which Congress 
constrains the President’s war initiatives.  In many circumstances, informal legislative 
actions such as threats to cut-off spending or to derail the President’s legislative agenda 
are often as effective (and less institutionally burdensome) as passing formal legislation to 
terminate an unpopular war.  
 
Finally, the President has an incentive to seek congressional approval for the use 
of force when there is a significant enough risk that the war will go wrong.  The President 
either seeks legislative authorization as a form of political insurance in order to spread the 
                                                 
306 See id. at 990; Benvenisti, supra note __ at 426. 
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electoral risks of military failure, or as a costly signal of the nation’s resolve to a foreign 
adversary. Unlike Congress, however, the President rarely follows the course of public 
opinion in his war powers initiatives.   Indeed, a presidential decision to capitulate to a 
foreign adversary in the face of declining public opinion polls is likely to be perceived as a 
sign of incompetence.  Thus, when there is a decline in public support for the use of force, 
the President is likely to escalate an international crisis and gamble on the revival of 
public support through strategic victories in the battlefield.   
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